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Abstract 
In the context of the STREST project, an engineering multi-level risk-based methodology 
to stress test critical non-nuclear infrastructures, named ST@STREST, has been 
developed. This reference report summarizes ST@STREST framework and its exploratory 
application to six key representative Critical Infrastructures (CIs) in Europe, exposed to 
variant hazards, namely: a petrochemical plant in Milazzo, Italy, large dams of the Valais 
region in Switzerland, hydrocarbon pipelines in Turkey, the Gasunie national gas storage 
and distribution network in Holland, the port infrastructure of Thessaloniki, Greece and 
an industrial district in the region of Tuscany, Italy. According to the characteristics of 
each case study, different stress test levels were applied. 
The application to the selected CIs is presented following the workflow of ST@STREST, 
comprised of four phases: Pre-Assessment phase; Assessment phase; Decision phase; 
and Report phase. First the goals, the method, the time frame, and the appropriate 
stress test level to apply are defined. Then, the stress test is performed at component 
and system levels and the outcomes are checked and compared to the acceptance 
criteria. A stress test grade is assigned and the global outcome is determined by 
employing a grading system. Finally, critical events and risk mitigation strategies are 
formulated and reported to stakeholders and authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are of essential importance for the modern society. Extreme 
natural events can interrupt services, cause damage, or even destroy such CI systems, 
which consequently trigger disruption of vital socio-economic activities, extensive 
property damage, and/or human injuries or loss of lives. Recent catastrophic events 
showed that the CI systems rarely recover their functionality back to the pre-disaster 
state, significantly increasing the concerns of the public. 
In the context of the STREST project, a harmonized approach for stress testing critical 
non-nuclear infrastructures, ST@STREST, has been developed. The aims of the 
ST@STREST methodology and framework are to quantify the safety and the risk of 
individual components as well as of whole CI system with respect to extreme events and 
to compare the expected behaviour of the CI to acceptable values. In particular, a multi-
level stress test methodology has been proposed. Each level is characterized by a 
different scope (component or system) and by a different level of risk analysis 
complexity (starting from design codes and ending with state-of-the-art probabilistic risk 
analyses, such as cascade modelling). This allows flexibility and application to a broad 
range of infrastructures. The framework is composed of four main phases and nine 
steps. First the goals, the method, the time frame, and the total costs of the stress test 
are defined. Then, the stress test is performed at component and system level; 
additionally, the outcomes are checked and analysed. Finally, the results are reported 
and communicated to stakeholders and authorities. The ST@STREST methodology 
(ST@STREST) is summarized in Chapter 2 of this report, with the details presented in 
the companion European Reference Report 4 (Esposito et al 2016). 
In the following chapters, the application of ST@STREST to six CIs in Europe is 
presented in detail: the ENI/Kuwait oil refinery and petrochemical plant in Milazzo, Italy 
when impacted by earthquakes and tsunamis (Chapter 3); the large dams in the Valais 
region of Switzerland under multi-hazard effects, considering earthquakes, floods, 
internal erosion, bottom outlet malfunctions, and hydropower system malfunction 
(Chapter 4); the major hydrocarbon pipelines in Turkey, focusing to seismic threats at 
pipe-fault crossing locations (Chapter 5); the Gasunie national gas storage and 
distribution network in Holland, exposed to earthquake and liquefaction effects (Chapter 
6); the port infrastructures of Thessaloniki in Greece, subjected to earthquake, tsunami 
and liquefaction hazards (Chapter 7); and the industrial district in the region of Tuscany, 
Italy, exposed to seismic hazard (Chapter 8). These case studies are representative of 
the CIs categories identified in STREST: 1) individual, single-site infrastructures with 
high risk and potential for high local impact and regional or global consequences; 2) 
distributed and/or geographically-extended infrastructures with potentially high 
economic and environmental impact, 3) distributed, multiple-site infrastructures with low 
individual impact but large collective impact or dependencies. The successful application 
of the proposed ST@STREST methodology to the six different CIs demonstrates its 
viability and shows there areas where additional developments are needed. 
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2. ST@STREST methodology for stress testing of critical 
non-nuclear infrastructures 
The aims of the proposed methodology are to assess the performance of individual 
components as well as of whole CI systems with respect to extreme events, and to 
compare this response to acceptable values (performance objectives) that are specified 
at the beginning of the stress test. ST@STREST is based on probabilistic and quantitative 
methods for best-possible characterization of extreme scenarios and consequences. 
The proposed ST@STREST methodology makes it possible to conduct stress test 
different levels, to accommodate the large diversity of CIs. Each Stress Test Level (ST-L) 
is characterized by different focus (component or system) and by different levels of risk 
analysis complexity (starting from design codes and ending with state-of-the-art 
probabilistic risk analyses). The selection of the appropriate Stress Test Level depends 
on regulatory requirements, based on the different importance of the CI, and the 
available human/financial resources to perform the stress test. 
The proposed ST@STREST process is transparent: a description of the assumptions 
made to identify the hazard and to model the risk (consequences) and the associated 
frequencies is required. The data, models and methods adopted for the risk assessment 
and the associated uncertainties are clearly documented and managed by different 
experts involved in the stress test process, following a pre-defined process for managing 
the multiple-expert integration (Selva et al 2015). This allows defining how reliable the 
results of the stress test are in terms of Accuracy (i.e. level of detail and sophistication) 
of the test. 
The workflow of ST@STREST comprises four phases: Pre-Assessment phase; 
Assessment phase; Decision phase; and Report phase. In the Pre-Assessment phase the 
data available on the CI (risk context) and on the phenomena of interest (hazard 
context) is collected. Then, the goal, the time frame, the total costs of the stress test, 
and the most appropriate Stress Test Level to apply to test the CI are defined.  In the 
Assessment phase, the stress test is performed at Component and System Levels. In the 
Decision phase, the stress test outcomes are checked, i.e. the results of risk assessment 
are compared to the objectives defined in Pre-Assessment phase. Then critical events, 
i.e. events that most likely cause a given level of loss, are identified and risk mitigation 
strategies and guidelines are formulated based on the identified critical events and 
presented in the Report phase. 
2.1 Multiple-expert integration 
The involvement of multiple experts is critical in a risk assessment when potential 
controversies exist and the regulatory concerns are relatively high. In order to produce 
robust and stable results, the integration of experts plays indeed a fundamental role in 
managing subjective decisions and in quantifying the epistemic uncertainty capturing 
‘the center, the body, and the range of technical interpretations that the larger technical 
community would have if they were to conduct the study’ (SSHAC, 1997). To this end, 
the experts’ diverse range of views and opinions, their active involvement, and their 
formal feedbacks need to be organized into a structured process ensuring transparency, 
accountability and independency. 
EU@STREST, a formalized multiple expert integration process has been developed within 
STREST (Selva et al 2015) and integrated into the ST@STREST Workflow. This process 
guarantees the robustness of stress test results, considering the differences among 
different CIs. With respect to the different levels in the SSHAC process developed for 
nuclear critical infrastructures (SSHAC, 1997), the proposed process is located between 
SSHAC levels 2 and 3 in terms of expert interaction, but it also makes an extensive use 
of classical Expert Elicitations, and is extended to single risk and multi-risk analyses. The 
core actors in EU@STREST are the Project Manager (PM), the Technical Integrator (TI), 
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the Evaluation Team (ET), the Pool of Experts (PoE), and the Internal Reviewers (IR). 
The roles of these actors and the interactions among them are described below. 
The PM is a stakeholder who owns the problem and is responsible and accountable for 
the successful development of the project and the communication with the authorities 
and public. The TI is an analyst responsible and accountable for the scientific 
management of the project, responsible for capturing the views of the informed technical 
community in the form of a community knowledge, to be implemented in the hazard and 
risk calculations. The ET is a group of analysts that actually perform the risk assessment 
required under the guidelines provided by the TI. The team is selected by the TI and the 
PM, and it may include internal CI resources and/or external experts. The ET also 
represents the interface between the project and the CI authorities, and guarantees the 
successful and reciprocal acknowledgement of choices and results. The PoE represents 
the larger technical community within the process. Individual experts of the PoE may 
also act as proponents and advocates a particular hypothesis or technical position, in 
individual communications with the TI. They participate in the interviewing processes 
lead by the TI, providing the TI with their opinions on critical choices/issues. The IR is 
one expert or a group of experts on subject matter under review that independently peer 
reviews and evaluates the work done by the TI and the ET. This group provides 
constructive comments and recommendations during the implementation of the project. 
In particular, IR reviews the coherence between TI choices and PM requests, the TI 
selection of the PoE in terms expertise coverage and scientific independence, the fairness 
of TI integration of PoE feedbacks, and the coherence between TI requests and ET 
implementations. The participation of the different actors varies along the different 
phases of the stress test (Fig. 2.1). 
2.2 ST@STREST workflow 
The ST@STREST workflow represents a systematic sequence of steps (processes), which 
have to be carried out in a stress test. The ST@STREST workflow shown in Fig. 2.1, 
comprises four phases and each phase is subdivided in a number of specific steps, with a 
total of 9 steps. In the following a detailed description of the four phases is provided 
together with a specification of the involvement of the different experts in process. 
2.2.1 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
The Pre-Assessment phase comprises three steps. First, the data available on the CI and 
on the phenomena of interest (hazard context) is collected in STEP 1 (Data collection). 
Also data coming from Stress Tests performed on other similar CI and other CIs in the 
same location is collected. In this step, the stress test participants are selected: the PM 
selects the TI and the IR; the TI and the PM jointly select the ET. Then, the TI, with the 
technical assistance of the ET, collects data and relevant information about hazards and 
the CI, and about previous stress tests. The TI pre-selects the potential target hazards 
and the relevant CI components. In STEP 2 (Risk Measures and Objectives), the goal of 
the project is defined. In particular, one or more risk measures (e.g. fatalities, economic 
losses) and objectives (e.g. expected loss, annual probability etc.) are defined by the 
PM, based on regulatory requirements and previous stress tests. Then in STEP 3 (Set-up 
of the Stress Test), the time frame, the total costs of the stress test, the most 
appropriate Stress Test Level (ST-L) and the stress test accuracy level to apply are 
defined. The selection of the ST-L is made by the PM with the assistance of the TI, based 
on regulatory requirements. The conclusion of STEP 3 may take time and may differ in 
case the PoE is in place or not. 
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Fig. 2.1  Workflow of ST@STREST methodology and interaction among the main actors 
during the multiple-expert process EU@STREST 
2.2.2 Phase 2: Assessment phase 
The Assessment phase is characterized by two steps in which the stress test is 
performed at the Component (STEP 4: Component Level Assessment) and the System 
(STEP 5: System Level Assessment) levels according to the Stress Test Level selected in 
Phase 1. At Component level, the performance of each component of the CI is checked 
by the hazard-based assessment, design-based assessment or risk-based assessment 
approach (see Section 2.3). This check is performed by the TI or by one expert of the ET 
selected by the TI. At System level, first, the TI finalizes the required models. In 
particular, if the PoE is in place (sub-levels c), the TI organizes the classical Expert 
Elicitations i) to fill potential methodological gaps, ii) to quantify the potential scenario 
and iii) to rank/score the alternative models to enable the quantification of the epistemic 
uncertainty. The members of the PoE perform the elicitation separately. Open 
discussions among the PoE members (moderated by the TI) are foreseen only if 
significant disagreements emerge in the elicitation results. If the PoE is not in place but 
EU assessment is required (sub-level b), the TI directly assigns scores/ranks the selected 
models. Then, the TI actually implements all the required models and performs the 
assessment, with the technical assistance of the ET. If specific technical problems 
emerge during the implementation and application, the TI may solve them through 
individual interactions with members of the PoE (if foreseen at the ST-Level, see Section 
2.3). 
2.2.3 Phase 3: Decision phase 
In the Decision Phase, the stress test outcomes are determined i.e. the results of risk 
assessment are compared with the risk objectives defined in Phase 1 (STEP 6: Risk 
Objectives Check). This task is performed by the TI, with the technical assistance of the 
ET. Depending on the type of risk measures and objectives defined by the PM (e.g. F-N 
curve, expected mean) and on the methods adopted, the comparison between results 
from probabilistic risk assessment with these goals may differ. One possibility to assess 
the outcome of the stress test is by using grading system (AA – negligible risk, A – as 
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low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) risk, B – possibly unjustifiable risk, C – intolerable 
risk) detailed in Section 2.4. Then critical events, i.e. events that most likely cause the 
exceedance of the considered loss value are identified through a disaggregation analysis 
in STEP 7 (Disaggregation/Sensitivity Analysis). Finally, risk mitigation strategies and 
guidelines are formulated based on the identified critical events in STEP 8 (Guidelines 
and Critical events). This task is performed by the TI with the technical assistance of the 
ET. All the results in all the steps of PHASE 2 and PHASE 3 are specifically documented 
by the TI. The IR reviews the activities performed in assessments from STEP 4 to STEP 
8. The TI, with the technical assistance of the ET, updates the final assessments 
accounting for the review. Final assessments and decisions are documented by the TI. 
Based on such documents, The PM, TI and IR make the final agreement. 
2.2.4 Phase 4: Report phase 
The Report phase comprises one step (STEP 9: Results Presentation) where the results 
are presented to CI authorities and regulators. This presentation is organized and 
performed by PM and TI. The presentation includes the outcome of the stress test in 
terms of the grade, the critical events, the guidelines for risk mitigation, and the 
accuracy of the methods adopted in the stress test. Note that the time for this 
presentation is set in PHASE 1, and it cannot be changed during PHASES 2 and 3. 
2.3 Stress test levels 
Due to the diversity of types of CIs and the potential consequence of failure of the CIs, 
the types of hazards and the available resources for conducting the stress tests, it is not 
optimal to require the most general form of the stress test for all possible situations. 
Therefore, three stress test variants, termed Stress Test Levels (ST-Ls) are proposed: 
o Level 1 (ST-L1): single-hazard component check; 
o Level 2 (ST-L2): single-hazard system-wide risk assessment; 
o Level 3 (ST-L3): multi-hazard system-wide risk assessment. 
Each ST-L is characterized by a different scope (component or system) and by a different 
complexity of the risk analysis (e.g. the consideration of multi hazard and multi risk 
events) as shown in Fig. 2.2. 
The aim of the ST-L1 (Component Level Assessment) is to check each component of a CI 
independently in order to show whether the component passes or fails the minimum 
requirements for its performance, which are defined in current design codes. The 
performance of each component of the CI is checked for the hazards selected as the 
most important (e.g. earthquake or flood, etc.). At component-level there are three 
methods to perform the single-hazard component check. These methods differ for the 
complexity and the data needed for the computation. The possible approaches are: the 
hazard-based assessment, design-based assessment, and the risk-based assessment 
approach. 
In the hazard-based assessment, the performance of the component is checked by 
comparing the design value of intensity of the hazard which was actually used in the 
design of the component (building, pipeline, storage tank, etc.), to the design value of 
intensity of the hazard prescribed in current regulatory documents or to the value of 
intensity according to the best possible knowledge. In the design-based assessment the 
expert compares the demand, with the capacity, (expressed in terms of forces, stresses, 
deformations or displacements). The assessment can be based on factoring the results 
from the existing design documentation or by performing design (assessment) of the 
component according to current state-of-practice. In the risk-based assessment, the 
hazard function at the location of the component and the fragility function of the 
component are required to evaluate the probability of meeting the risk acceptance 
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criteria. Design-based assessment is recommended when only ST-L1 is performed. In 
the case, when ST-L1 is followed by ST-L2, in which component-specific fragility 
functions are used, it makes sense to perform risk-based assessment of the components 
since fragility functions are anyway required in ST-L2. More details on the possible 
approaches for ST-L1 assessment can be found in STREST D5.1 (Esposito et al 2016). 
Since a CI is a system of interacting components, ST-L1 is inherently not adequate. 
Nevertheless, ST-L1 is obligatory because design of (most) CI components is regulated 
by design codes, and the data and the expertise are available. Further, for some CIs, the 
computation of system-level analysis (single and multi-risk) could be overly demanding 
in terms of available knowledge and resources. The outcome of the ST-L1 is most often 
qualitative, e.g. component is compliant with the current regulation, component is not 
compliant with current regulation, or the regulation does not yet exist for this type of 
component or type of hazard. 
 
Fig. 2.2  ST-Levels in the ST@STREST methodology 
The stress test assessment at the system level of the CI is foreseen at ST-L2 or ST-L3 
where the probabilistic risk analysis of the entire CI (system) is performed. The system 
level assessment is highly recommended, since it is the only way of revealing the 
majority of the mechanisms leading to potential unwanted consequences. However, note 
that it requires more knowledge and resources (financial, staff) for conducting the stress 
test, thus it is not made obligatory (if not required by regulations). At these levels, 
potentially different implementations are possible. The quantification of epistemic 
uncertainty may not be performed (sub-level a). If performed, it may be based either on 
the evaluations of a single expert (sub-level b) or on the evaluations of multiple-experts 
(sub-level c). Indeed, a more accurate quantification of the technical community 
knowledge distribution (describing the epistemic uncertainty) can be reached if more 
experts are involved in the analysis and, in particular, when dealing with all critical 
choices. A description of possible methods to threat epistemic uncertainty in each ST-
Level and sub-level can be found in STREST D5.1 (Esposito et al 2016) and SSHAC 
(1997). 
Further, in case specific needs have been identified in the Pre-assessment phase (e.g. 
important methodological/modelling gaps) and such requirements cannot be included 
into the risk assessment for whatever reason, scenario-based analysis should be also 
performed as complementary to the system ST-L selected (sub-level d). Levels 2d and 
3d are complementary to L2c and L3c, respectively. In this case, multiple experts define 
and evaluate possible scenarios that, for whatever reason, cannot be included into 
probabilistic risk analysis. In this case, the choice of performing a scenario-based 
assessment should be justified and documented by the TI, and reviewed by the IR. If 
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scenario-based assessment is finally selected, the choice of the scenarios should be 
based on ad hoc expert elicitation experiments of the PoE (SSHAC 1997). These 
additional scenarios are meant to further investigate the epistemic uncertainty by 
including events otherwise neglected only for technical reasons. Indeed, L2d and L3d are 
performed to evaluate the potential impact of epistemic gaps identified by experts, 
eventually increasing the capability of exploring the effective epistemic uncertainty.  
Thus, it is foreseen only as complementary to a full quantification of epistemic 
uncertainty in a multiple-expert framework. 
The system level analysis is thus performed according to: 1) the degree of complexity of 
the analysis (single vs. multi hazards), and 2) the degree of involvement of the technical 
community in taking critical decisions and in the quantification of the epistemic 
uncertainty for the computation of risk. According to these two aspects a subdivision for 
ST levels has been introduced (Table 2.1, Fig. 2.2). The selection of the actual procedure 
to be implemented (row and column in Table 2.1) is performed in the Pre-Assessment 
(Phase 1). These two choices essentially depend on regulatory requirements, on the 
different importance of the CI, and on the available human/financial resources to 
perform the stress test. A criticality assessment of the CIs, aimed at identifying and 
ranking CIs, may represent a practical tool to support the choice of the appropriate ST 
level (Esposito et al 2016). 
Table 2.1  ST-Levels 
  Number of Experts 
  Single-expert Multiple-expert 
 Epistemic Uncertainty No Yes Yes 
ST-L 
1 1a - - 
2 2a 2b 2c (+2d) 
3 - - 3c (+3d) 
2.4 Proposed grading system 
The first outcome of the stress test, obtained in the STEP 6 (Risk Objectives Check), is 
described using a grading system, proposed herein, and is based on the comparison of 
results of risk assessment with the risk objectives (i.e. acceptance criteria) defined at 
the beginning of the test (STEP 2: Risk Measures and Objectives).  
The proposed grading system (Fig. 2.3) is composed of three different outcomes: Pass, 
Partly Pass, and Fail. The CI passes the stress test if it attains grade AA or A. The former 
grade corresponds to negligible risk and is expected to be the goal for new CIs, whereas 
the latter grade corresponds to risk being as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP; 
Jonkman et al 2003) and is expected to be the goal for existing CIs. Further, the CI 
partly passes the stress test if it receives grade B, which corresponds to possibly 
unjustifiable risk. Finally, the CI fails the stress test if it is given grade C, which 
corresponds to intolerable risk. 
The project manager (PM) of the stress test defines the boundaries between grades (i.e. 
the risk objectives) by following requirements of the regulators. The boundaries can be 
expressed as scalar (Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4, top) or continuous (Fig. 2.4, bottom) 
measures. Examples of the former include the annual probability of the risk measure 
(e.g. loss of life) and the expected value of the risk measure (e.g. expected number of 
fatalities per year), whereas the latter is often represented by an F-N curve, where F 
represents the cumulative frequency of the risk measure N per given period of time. In 
several countries, an F-N curve is defined as a straight line on a log-log plot. However, 
the parameters of these curves, as well as parameters of scalar risk objectives (i.e. 
regulatory boundaries in general) may differ between countries and industries (Bowles et 
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al 1999; Health & Safety Executive (HSE) 1989; MHLUPE 1988; Paté-Cornell 1994; 
Whitman 1984). 
 
Fig. 2.3  Grading system for the global outcome of stress test 
In general, the CI performance can be understood as time-variant. It may change due to 
several reasons, such as ageing long-term degradation process (e.g. corrosion), man-
made events (e.g. terrorist attacks), changes in exposure (e.g. population growth) that 
may increase the probability of failure or loss of functionality or exacerbate the 
consequences of failure during their lifetime (Fig. 2.3). In the proposed grading system, 
it is foreseen that the performance of the CI or the performance objectives can change 
over time. Consequently, the outcome of the stress test is also time-variant. For this 
reason, stress tests are periodic, which is also accounted for by the grading system. If 
the CI passes a stress test (grade AA or A), the risk objectives for the next stress test do 
not change until the next stress test. The longest time between successive stress tests 
should be defined by the regulator considering the cumulative risk. However, most of 
existing CIs will probably obtain grade B or even C, which means that the risk is possibly 
unjustifiable or intolerable, respectively. In these cases, the grading system has to 
stimulate the stakeholders to upgrade the existing CI or to start planning a new CI in the 
following stress test cycle. It is proposed that stricter risk objectives are used or that the 
time between the successive stress tests is reduced in order to make it possible that 
stakeholders adequately upgrade their CIs in few repetitions of stress tests, which 
means that the CI will eventually obtain grade A or the regulator will require that the 
operation of the CI be terminated.  
The basis for redefinition of risk objectives in the next evaluation of stress tests is the 
so-called characteristic point of risk. In the case when scalar risk measures are used, the 
characteristic point of risk is represented directly by the results of risk assessment (Fig. 
2.4, top). In the case when the result of risk assessment is expressed by an F-N curve, 
the characteristic point is defined by one point of the F-N curve. It is recommended that 
the point associated with the greatest risk above the ALARP region be selected. In this 
case the characteristic point is defined as the point of the F-N curve which is the farthest 
from the limit F-N curve that represents the boundary between grades A and B (A-B 
boundary) (see blue line in Fig. 2.4a). 
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Once the characteristic point is determined, the grading system parameters for the next 
evaluation of stress test can be defined. If the CI obtains grade B in the first evaluation 
of stress test (ST1, blue dot in Fig. 2.4a), the grading system foresees the reduction of 
the distance between grades B and C (B-C boundary) in the next stress test (ST2, Fig. 
2.4b). This reduction should be equal to the amount of cumulative risk beyond the 
ALARP region assessed in ST1. This ensures risk equity over two cycles, which may be 
expressed by the following expression: 
evaluated, ST1 (A-B) (B-C), ST1 (B-C), ST2
R R  = R R   (2.1) 
where R(A-B) is the A-B boundary, R(B-C),ST1 and R(B-C),ST2 are the B-C boundary in ST1 and 
ST2, respectively, and Revaluated,ST1 is the value of risk measure assessed in the ST1. Note 
that the left side of the Eq. 3.7 is equal to the amount of risk beyond the ALARP region 
assessed in ST1. Furthermore, if grade C (red dot in Fig. 2.4a) is given in ST1, both the 
B-C boundary and the period until ST2 are reduced (Fig. 2.4c). In this case, the B-C 
boundary is set equal to the A-B boundary, since this is the maximum possible reduction 
of the region of possibly unjustifiable risk. Moreover, the reduced period until ST2 
(tcycle,redefined) is determined on the basis of equity of risk above the ALARP region over 
two cycles and can be calculated using the following expression: 
evaluated, ST1 (A-B)
cycle,redefined cycle,initial
(B-C), ST1 (A-B)
R R
t  = t
R R



 (2.2) 
where tcycle,initial is the initial amount of time between two stress tests. 
 
Fig. 2.4  Grading system in time domain using scalar risk objectives (top) and limit F-N 
curves (bottom): a) two different results of the first evaluation of stress test (ST1), b) 
redefinition of the parameters of the grading system due to Result 1 in ST1, and c) 
redefinition of the parameters of the grading system due to Result 2 in ST1 
2.4.1 Grading of the components 
Similar to the case of system level assessment, three thresholds need to be defined 
(between grades AA and A, between grades A and B and between grades B and C) in 
order to consistently evaluate the components of a CI. 
For the Component-Level Assessment (STEP 4), there are three methods to perform the 
single-hazard component check: the hazard-based assessment, design-based 
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assessment and the risk-based assessment approach. These methods differ for the 
complexity and the data needed for the computation. 
If the result of a hazard-based assessment or a design-based assessment is that the 
component is in compliance with the requirements, a grade A is assigned to the 
component. If these types of assessment result in the component not being in 
compliance with the requirements, a grade C is assigned to the component or a higher 
accuracy level assessment is required. However, the grading system at the component 
level is equal to that proposed in the case of system-level assessment if risk-based 
assessment is used. 
If a component is assigned grade C, mitigation actions need to be taken. The time in 
which the grade needs to be improved depends on the type of assessment. If a hazard-
based or a design-based assessment is used, the mitigation has to be made 
immediately, as the component is not in compliance with the requirements. If a risk-
based assessment is used, the time in which the grade has to be improved is determined 
on the basis of the amount of risk corresponding to the component reaching the 
designated limit state (see ERR4, Esposito et al 2016 for more details). 
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3. Application of stress test concepts to ENI/Kuwait oil 
refinery and petrochemical plant, Milazzo, Italy 
3.1 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
3.1.1 Data collection 
The refinery of Milazzo (Raffineria di Milazzo) is located in the north part of the island of 
Siciliy, in Italy. It is an industrial complex, which transforms crude oil into a series of oil 
products currently available on the market (LPG, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel and fuel oil) 
and comprises a number of auxiliary services. Total production currently stands at circa 
9.3 million tons. The refinery has many storage tanks containing a large variety of 
hydrocarbons, such as LPG, gasoline, gasoil, crude oil and atmospheric and vacuum 
residues. The capacities of the tanks vary from 100 m3 (fuel oil, gasoil, gasoline, 
kerosene) to 160 000 m3 (crude oil). All tanks are located in catch basins (bunds) with 
concrete surfaces. Only the LPG is stored in pressurised spheres, all other substances 
are stored in single containment tanks. A filling degree of 80 % is assumed. 
In a QRA the societal risk is determined. In order to do so, the (actual) presence of 
persons in the surroundings needs to be taken into account (Fig. 3.1), since the numbers 
of persons present influences the societal risk. Only persons within the impact area of 
the site need to be taken into account. Persons on-site are not considered for the 
external risk. 
 
Fig. 3.1  Overview of population density as used in QRA 
3.2 Phase 2: Assessment phase 
Natural events may dramatically interact with industrial equipment with different 
intensity and hazards (Krausmann et al 2011; Salzano et al 2013). 
3.2.1 Component level assessment (ST-L1a) 
When NaTech risks should be considered, the natural hazards should be evaluated for 
the site under analysis, following the methodologies detailed in previous work-packages 
and deliverables of the STREST project. 
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Earthquake hazard 
The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) presented in this section concerns the 
Italian port of Milazzo, situated in northern Sicily. For the purposes of this study, the 
area around Milazzo was discretized into a grid of forty-eight points (potential seismic 
event epicentres) with a grid spacing of approximately 25 km, as shown in the following 
Fig. 3.2. 
 
Fig. 3.2  Grid of potential epicentres around Milazzo considered in the PSHA analysis. 
Grid points within a 50 km radius from Milazzo are displayed as red dots 
For each single point on this grid, the Italian National Institute of Geophysics and 
Volcanology (Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia - INGV) provided the joint 
probability mass of strike, dip and rake, for a total of around three thousand four 
hundred “rupture scenarios” of probability. This information forms the basis of the 
elaboration, as it allows the probabilistic assignment of finite-fault geometries to all 
scenarios that enter the PSHA calculations. The hazard curve for Milazzo in terms of peak 
ground acceleration (PGA), can be found in Fig. 3.3. 
 
Fig. 3.3  Hazard curve for Milazzo in terms of MAF of exceedance of PGA, calculated 
according to the methodology presented 
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Tsunami hazard 
Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis (PTHA) is a methodology to assess the exceedance 
probability of different thresholds of hazard intensity, at a specific site or region in a 
given time period, due to any given source. Different potential tsunamigenic sources 
should be considered, such as earthquakes, landslides, meteorite impacts or atmospheric 
phenomena. Here, we focus only on tsunami of seismic origin, which is the dominant 
component of PTHA in most of the areas of the world, both in terms of occurrence and in 
terms of effects (Parsons & Geist 2009). Following the definition proposed in Lorito et al 
(2015), we deal with Seismic PTHA (SPTHA), that is, tsunamis generated by co-seismic 
sea floor displacements due to earthquakes. 
3.2.2 System level assessment for single hazard (ST-L2b / L2d) 
Probabilistic risk assessment 
The impact of natural hazards on the accident or release scenarios and frequencies is 
discussed. The release frequencies are given in Table 3.1. These frequencies have been 
calculated by taking into account the methodology described in STREST D4.1 (Salzano et 
al 2015), where equipment vulnerability with respect to the intensity of the natural 
events has been assessed by taking into account the construction characteristics of 
equipment and, more important, the new limit states based on the release of content. 
Scenario based assessment 
Flammable substances can be ignited upon release. Direct ignition will lead to a pool fire 
(liquids) or jet fire (gases). If a liquid is not ignited immediately, it will start to evaporate 
and a flammable atmosphere could be formed, which will disperse with the wind. If a gas 
is not ignited immediately, the gas will also disperse. 
Ignition of that flammable cloud will result in a flash fire, with possibly an explosion 
(causing overpressure effects), if the cloud is obstructed. 
It has been assumed that the consequences of a delayed ignition are minor compared to 
the consequences of a pool fire for the flammable liquids: only pool fires have been 
considered. 
A special phenomenon occurs upon the instantaneous release of a liquefied gas. 
An instantaneous release is followed by an instantaneous evaporation and a physical 
explosion, called Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE). Often the gas cloud 
is ignited resulting in a fireball. 
The probability of ignition depends on the flammability of a substance and the quantity 
released. Table 3.2 presents the ignition probabilities according to the Purple Book 
(VROM 2005). 
Not all substances present on site are considered individually and representative 
substances have been determined. Table 3.3 shows which representative substance is 
used for each product. Atmospheric residue, heavy vacuum gas oil and vacuum residue 
have not been considered in the QRA. For all flammable liquids considered, the ignition 
probability of K1-liquids is assumed: this is a conservative approach. 
The probability of a BLEVE is given in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.1  Scenarios and frequencies for stationary vessels due to natural hazards 
Scenario Frequency (-/yr)  
 Atmospheric vessels- 
single containment 
Pressurized 
vessels 
Pipelines 
Earthquake    
Instantaneous release of the 
complete inventory 
3.70·10-3 1.16·10-9 - 
Continuous release of the complete 
inventory in 10 min at a constant rate 
of release 
3.70·10-3 1.16·10-9 - 
Continuous release from a hole with 
an effective diameter of 10 mm 
7.33·10-2 0 - 
Full bore rupture - - 5.56·10-2 
Tsunami Atmospheric vessels- 
single containment 
Pressurized 
vessels 
Pipelines 
Instantaneous release of the 
complete inventory 
1.85·10-5- 3.47·10-4 0 - 
Continuous release of the complete 
inventory in 10 min at a constant rate 
of release 
1.85·10-5- 3.47·10-4 0 - 
Continuous release from a hole with 
an effective diameter of 10 mm 
0 0 - 
Full bore rupture - - 0 
Earthquake + Tsunami    
Instantaneous release of the 
complete inventory 
3.7·10-3- 4.05·10-3 1.16 ·10-9 - 
Continuous release of the complete 
inventory in 10 min at a constant rate 
of release 
3.7·10-3- 4.05·10-3 1.16 ·10-9 - 
Continuous release from a hole with 
an effective diameter of 10 mm 
7.33·10-2 0 - 
Full bore rupture - - 5.56·10-2 
Table 3.2  Ignition probabilities 
Source Direct ignition probability (-) 
Substance 
Continuous Instantaneou
s 
K3,
4 
K2 K1 
liquid 
K0, Gas, low 
reactive 
K0, Gas, average/ 
high reactive 
< 10 kg/s < 1000 kg 0 0.01 0.065 0.02 0.2 
10-100 
kg/s 
1000- 10 
000 kg 
0 0.01 0.065 0.04 0.5 
> 100 kg/s > 10 000 kg 0 0.01 0.065 0.09 0.7 
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Table 3.3  Representative substances 
Product Representative substance 
Atm residue NA 
Crude Pentane 
Fuel oil Nonane  
Gasoil Nonane 
Gasoline Pentane 
HVGO NA 
Jet/ kerosene Nonane 
LPG Propane 
Naphtha Pentane 
Others Pentane 
VAC residue NA 
Table 3.4  BLEVE probability 
 Probability BLEVE 
Stationary installations 0.7 
3.3 Phase 3: Decision phase 
3.3.1 Single risk analysis 
The calculated risk for each individual event (industrial, earthquake, or tsunami) is first 
compared. Fig. 3.4 presents the locational risk contours. The black crosses indicate the 
location of the scenarios. The industrial risks result in large contours, especially for the 
lower risk levels (10-7, 10-8/yr). These contours are dominated by the risks related to the 
LPG storage vessels. The location of the LPG tanks is given in Fig. 3.5 by the red 
squares. When only considering earthquake induced risks the 10-7 and 10-8/yr risk 
contours are smaller. This is due to the lower release frequency for the LPG vessels. The 
higher risk levels (> 10-6/yr) are dominated by the atmospheric vessels. These have a 
higher release frequency compared to the industrial risks, resulting in larger 10-5 and 10-
4/yr contours. 
The industrial risks on the right side of the site are mainly caused by the atmospheric 
tanks. When comparing the industrial risks with the earthquake induced risks, one can 
observe that the risks on the right side of the site have increased by a factor of approx. 
1000: for the earthquake induced risks the 10-4/yr contour is located at almost the same 
location as the 10-7/yr contour of the industrial risks. This is due to the failure frequency 
of the atmospheric tanks: failure due to earthquake is a factor 1000 higher than failure 
due to industrial activities. 
The risks associated with tsunami-induced releases are the smallest of the three release 
causes. Only atmospheric vessels close to the shore will result in releases. Vessels 
located further away do not pose risks. 
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Industrial risks 
 
 
Earthquake risks 
 
 Tsunami risks 
Fig. 3.4  Locational risk – Single hazard only. Larger figures are included in Appendix I 
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Fig. 3.5  Location of LPG Spheres (red squares) 
3.3.2 Combined risk analysis 
Fig. 3.6 shows the location risk when considering: 
o industrial risks + earthquake induced risks; 
o industrial risks + tsunami induced risks; 
o industrial risks + earthquake and tsunami induced risks. 
The most dominant risks are the industrial and earthquake induced risks. 
3.3.3 Guidelines and critical events 
For a better comparison of the locational risk, a horizontal cross-section of the locational 
risk is made. This line is given in Fig. 3.7. 
The locational risk along the red line is given in Fig. 3.8. The distance 0 m corresponds 
to the left end of the red line in Fig. 3.7. The black line (industrial risks) is overlapped by 
the purple (industrial + tsunami), orange (industrial + earthquake + tsunami) and green 
(industrial + earthquake) lines between 0 and 1400 m. The red line (tsunami) starts at 
1400 m and is overlapped by the purple line (industrial + tsunami). Beyond 1400 m the 
orange (industrial + earthquake + tsunami) line, blue line (earthquake) and green line 
(industrial + earthquake) overlap. Fig. 3.8 shows that for this pilot case low risks (< 10-6 
/yr) are dominated by the industrial risks as these risks are caused by failure of the LPG 
vessels. Earthquake and tsunami do not damage these vessels. Tsunami results in 
approximately 10 times higher risk along the transect line and earthquakes in 
approximately 1000 times higher risk. 
Naturally induced hazards cause an increase in the total risks. As a tsunami only 
damages a limited number of the vessels along the shoreline, the risk increase is limited. 
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Similar results, for earthquakes only and simplified analysis for the earthquake hazard, 
have been found in other works (Salzano et al 2003; Campedel et al 2008; Fabbrocino et 
al 2005; Salzano et al 2009). 
 
 
Industrial + earthquake 
induced risks 
 
 
Industrial + tsunami 
induced risks 
 
 
 Industrial, earthquake 
and tsunami induced 
risks 
Fig. 3.6  Locational risk – Hazard combinations 
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Fig. 3.7  The cross-section of the locational risk (red line) in Fig. 3.8 
 
Fig. 3.8  Locational risk transect 
The societal risk for the base situation (without accounting for natural hazards) is 
presented in Fig. 3.9. 
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Fig. 3.9  Societal risk without accounting for natural hazards- with and without LPG tanks 
The societal risk is mainly caused by the LPG tanks, as can be seen by comparing the 
black and red line. By not accounting for the LPG tanks (purple line), the maximum 
number of fatalities is reduced from 1650 to 220. 
Fig. 3.10 shows the societal risk per cause. Up to approx. 200 fatalities the naturally 
induced hazards have a higher frequency of occurring, due to the higher failure 
frequency of the atmospheric vessels. Larger numbers of fatalities are only caused by 
industrial risks or by earthquakes - this is due to the failure of the LPG vessels. 
 
Fig. 3.10  Societal risk- industrial, earthquake or tsunami induced 
The cumulated risks are given in Fig. 3.11 (the orange and green line overlap). 
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Fig. 3.11  Societal risk- cumulated risks 
Fatalities up to approx. 200 are dominated by earthquakes; more than 200 fatalities are 
dominated by the industrial causes. 
3.4 Phase 4: Report phase 
Naturally induced hazards can play an important role in the total risk associated with the 
presence of installations with dangerous goods. In this study the effect of an increased 
frequency (caused by earthquakes or tsunamis) of a number of release scenarios on 
locational and societal risk was assessed. 
The impact of natural induced hazards depends on many (location specific) factors. For 
the specific site analysed in this work, a tsunami only damages a limited number of the 
atmospheric storage vessels along the shoreline. Hence the increase on the total risk is 
limited. Nonetheless, the overloading of emergency response should be considered, at 
least for the tanks along the coastline. 
Of more importance is the effect of an earthquake, which significantly increases the 
failure frequency of atmospheric storage tanks. Neither an earthquake nor a tsunami 
significantly increases the failure frequency of, and hence risk imposed by, pressurised 
vessels (like LPG spheres). As for the considered site, the risk is largely dominated by 
the LPG tanks when failing due to industrial-related causes, whereas the impact of the 
natural hazards is limited. 
All in all though, naturally induced hazards should be considered when determining the 
overall risk and the risks associated with natural disaster. 
This pilot case has been performed to show the impact of naturally induced hazards on 
the outcome of a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of an industrial site holding 
dangerous substances. The aim was not to perform a detailed QRA of the pilot site (for 
such exercise much more detailed information would have been required) but merely to 
show how (the more common) scenarios are affected by an increased release frequency 
caused by earth quakes and tsunamis. 
Other scenarios that may be relevant in cases of earthquakes or tsunamis have not been 
evaluated. For instance failure of multiple tanks has not been taken into account. This 
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may result in released volumes exceeding the catch basins capacity, and hence lead to 
larger pool sizes, especially in case of failure of catch basins. 
Also domino effects have not been considered. For instance, if a pool of flammable 
material extends to an area with LPG spheres, BLEVEs may occur. Neither has the effect 
of debris (or large objects like ships) carried land inward with a tsunami, been taken into 
account. Such phenomena will result in larger effect areas, and may hence increase the 
number of casualties. However, it should be realised that the natural hazards we are 
considering here (earthquakes and tsunamis) have a large areal impact. This means 
many of the fatalities calculated in the QRA, would have occurred also had such an 
installation not been present, because of the collapse of houses and other buildings. 
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4. Application of stress test concepts to large dams in the 
Valais region of Switzerland 
4.1 Introduction 
Although design, maintenance, and surveillance practices depend on national 
legislations, the international guidelines (e.g. International Commission on Large Dams, 
ICOLD) that many national codes reflect aim to avoid dam failures altogether, this being 
true even in the face of extreme natural events (such as floods or earthquakes). 
Worldwide this objective has been, at least so far, very well met. Fortunately, in the last 
decades relatively few large dams have failed due to natural causes in countries that 
enforce the internationally accepted best practices in terms of dam safety. 
Regardless of specific characteristics, dams operate by storing substantial volumes of 
water in the upstream reservoir, the release of this water to downstream areas being 
controlled according to operational guidelines and targets. In view of that, in order to 
correctly frame risk and vulnerability assessments for dams, one should consider, 
beyond the dam body, the foundation, the reservoir, the appurtenant structures (e.g. 
spillways, bottom outlets, or hydropower systems) and, most importantly, the 
downstream areas potentially affected by floods. 
Following a dam failure or breach, typically characterized by an uncontrolled release of 
the reservoir, a large amount of water travels downstream in the form of a dam-break 
wave. While the dam-reservoir system is vulnerable to several hazards and monetary 
losses associated with it in the event of a failure amount to very large figures, the larger 
share of the losses associated with a dam failure are likely to occur downstream (Fig. 
4.1). Stemming from this, and while it is important to pay close attention to the dam-
reservoir system (in order to quantify the probability of failures taking place and as a 
means to assess which are the most likely chains of events potentially leading to those 
failures), evaluating the processes that may unfold downstream is paramount. 
  
Fig. 4.1  Dam break wave spreading across a river flood plain and inundating a city. 
Colour characterizing water depths from dark blue (0 m) to bright red (30 m) 
Safety assessments for large dams have been routinely carried out for decades. These 
often include geological surveys, numerical modelling of the dam structures, hydrological 
studies, and hydraulic evaluations of outlet structures. The engineering supporting these 
endeavours is well developed albeit mostly based on deterministic frameworks. National 
legislations, ICOLD Bulletins, and ICOLD benchmark workshops (Gunn et al 2016; Zenz 
and Goldgruber 2013) are a great source of information on current best practices. 
How the transition to probabilistic approaches is to be made in the field of dam safety is, 
today, a topic of heated debate. Regardless of how that transition will unfold, it is 
Application of stress test concepts to large dams in the Valais region of Switzerland 
26  
 
believed that, in the future, probabilistic approaches will gain increased relevance in 
relation to deterministic ones. 
One of the general conclusions of the conceptual case study analysed in STREST 
(Pitilakis et al 2016; Salzano et al 2015) is that it is increasingly possible to address 
long-standing limitations of probabilistic frameworks, most notably the computational 
demands associated with numerical modelling of dam structural responses and dam-
break wave propagation. 
From a technical perspective, large dams’ features change widely in order to adapt to 
each project’s specificities and their behaviour is not easily – nor should it be – predicted 
without the laborious undertaking of customized numerical simulations (e.g. Gunn et al 
2016; Zenz and Goldgruber 2013). One of the main challenges of applying ambitious 
probabilistic frameworks to dam safety is how to evaluate numerous scenarios without 
making hefty concessions on the numerical modelling side. It is proposed that machine 
learning regression models are used to “map” a reduced number of numerical model 
outcomes to a whole domain of possible hazards and element responses. 
Conceptually, hazard inter-actions, “intra-actions”, and coincidences may lead to failures 
that are difficult to foresee resorting to a deterministic approach. In parallel, uncertainty 
on hazard characterization and element responses may have an acknowledgeable impact 
on overall risk, which presents a further advantage of relying on probabilistic 
frameworks. 
The work developed on large dams within STREST below is a follow-up to STREST’s D4.1 
(Salzano et al 2015), where the basis of the methodology is laid out, STREST’s D6.1 
(Pitilakis et al 2016), where it is extended. It attempted to overcome hurdles related to 
the practical application of probabilistic frameworks. Naturally, this section reflects 
lessons learnt from that experience. The Generic Multi-Risk (GenMR) framework was 
adopted as the computational tool to “manage” simulations. It is based on a sequential 
Monte Carlo method and its principles are well described in Mignan et al (2014). 
Obviously, when using this method – as much as any other – reliable outcomes are very 
much dependent on realistic inputs. 
The findings reported here are based on a conceptual case study of a large alpine 
earthfill dam. The infrastructure is approximately 100 m high, with a reservoir capable of 
holding over 100 000 000 m3 of water. It is equipped with a spillway in order to cope 
with excessive water levels, a bottom outlet that allows for the control of the volume of 
water stored, and a hydropower system through which the main purpose of the dam is 
fulfilled: producing energy. The modelled system includes also the valley below the dam 
down to a distance of roughly 30 km, where a sizable urban agglomeration is assumed 
to exist. 
4.2 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
The pre-assessment is arguably the most important part of the stress test of large dams. 
Very relevant on its own, the response of each element of the system to hazard-induced 
actions is essential and an input to the Monte Carlo probabilistic framework. 
This phase of the stress test will not be particularly emphasized, as the 
recommendations, methodologies and models required to complete it are well 
established among the dam engineering community. Also, checking whether each 
component of the system is up to par with regulations is recommended practise already. 
That said, it is important to highlight that applying a probabilistic framework should not 
equate to a relaxation of the standards proposed for existing safety assessments based 
on deterministic principles. Although such a step was bypassed on the test case 
presented in STREST D6.1 (Pitilakis et al 2016) it is recommended that a full range of 
element’s responses is computed through the use of detailed models prior to the 
application of a probabilistic framework. In the case of constraining computational 
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demands involved in doing so, it is recommended that a regression model be fitted from 
a number of computed actions/responses pairs (e.g. a catalogue of peak ground 
acceleration’s effects on sustained damages or degrees of functionality). Regression 
models of this type and their regression errors would allow for n-dimensional fragility 
functions to be prepared for posterior employment in fast-to-compute probabilistic Monte 
Carlo simulations. 
4.3 Phase 2: Assessment phase (ST-L3c / L3d) 
Classical risk analyses for dams generally correspond to very detailed scenario-based 
analyses considering only a few hazard interactions. Here, ST-L3c was tested with 
promising results, being therefore the recommended approach. Falling into a ST-L3d 
level, scenarios tested according to current practice should continue to be carried out for 
rare events of interest which are not easily reproduced using a purely probabilistic 
analysis. 
It is recommended that the risk study of a large dam is split into two main parts: the 
dam-reservoir system, whose analysis should yield failure conditions, modes, and 
expected frequency, and the downstream area, which focused on the development of 
eventual breaches, the propagation of dam-break waves, and the evaluation of losses. 
 
Fig. 4.2  Scheme of hazards, elements, system states, and interactions considered in the 
application of the GenMR framework to large dams. Case of an embankment dam. 
Adapted from Mignan et al (2015) and presented in Matos et al (2015) 
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Focusing on the dam-reservoir system, it is suggested that hazards are not studied 
individually, but rather that an inclusive modelling approach is implemented. As an 
example, STREST proposed the (simplified) scheme of hazards, elements, system states 
and interactions illustrated in Fig. 4.2. Such a scheme is dynamical in nature, and thus 
requires lengthy and full simulations of the system to yield results. Some advantages of 
its use are a quantitative appreciation of occurrence frequencies, the representation of 
inter-actions, “intra-actions” and coincidences, and the possibility of accounting for 
aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties. 
An example of results obtainable through the proposed dynamic simulations is presented 
in Fig. 4.3. There, a failure by overtopping is prompted by the occurrence two related 
earthquakes (T=12 600 years followed by T=3 200 years). While the dam withstood 
both, its outlet structures did not and recovery efforts were unsuccessful in rehabilitating 
them before the peak of the inflow season. Without a full simulation of the dam-reservoir 
system such a chain of events could certainly be imagined, but its probability would be 
hard to guess and, therefore, so would its relevance. 
 
Fig. 4.3  Example of a chain of events leading to failure (Pitilakis et al 2016) 
Hazard coincidences appeared to affect the risk of the system (Matos et al 2015). More 
relevantly still, including effects of epistemic uncertainty related to hazards and 
uncertainty at the level of the component’s responses led to an approximate 4-fold 
increase in risk in comparison to that of a system evaluated based on expected values. 
Moving downstream, assessing losses associated with a failure is an intricate process 
which is, as the former, marked by uncertainty. One can start with the hydrograph that 
characterized the dam-break wave near the dam; in the case of embankment dams, 
closely related to the development of the breach. Froehlich (2008) addressed this issue 
and quantified how, even under similar initial conditions, breaches can develop 
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differently. Naturally, these differences are relevant to loss estimation endeavours. An 
example of two very different (but possible) floods resulting from a failure of the 
conceptual dam that was studied is shown in Fig. 4.4. 
It is advised that the full range of possible dam-break waves is studied. This is, however, 
not straightforward. Current numerical models useful for studying the propagation of 
dam-break waves – particularly 2D, which are the generally more accurate than 1D ones 
– are computationally demanding and running them for a great number of possible 
outflow hydrographs may be quite unpractical. As proposed in Pitilakis et al (2016) and 
Darcourt (2016), which used the free BASEMENT software for hydraulic modelling 
(Vetsch et al 2005), the problem may be overcome by resorting to non-linear regression 
models calibrated based on a limited but well-chosen catalogue of simulations. If well 
fitted, regression models can be used to estimate inundation parameters (e.g. max. 
water depth, max. water velocity, or wave arrival time) in any location of the 
computational domain for any possible dam breach event. A discussion of the challenges 
associated with the hydraulic modelling of sizeable areas can be found in Darcourt 
(2016). 
 
Fig. 4.4  Inundations calculated for low (left) and high (high) peak discharge/volume 
breach hydrographs. Adapted from Pitilakis et al (2016) 
The process summarized until now allows the calculation of inundation parameters and 
the evaluation of their probability of occurrence, including epistemic and aleatoric 
uncertainties. Tangible as well as intangible losses can be computed as a function of 
these. In essence, the methodologies already developed to do so within deterministic 
frameworks can be used. Due to this, the work that focused on large dams under 
STREST did not go into great detail in what concerns the estimation of losses, having 
stopped short of estimating costs or loss of life. It did, however, estimate damages to 
buildings based on fragility curves which, based on a fortunate shortage of observations 
for dam-break events, were based on damages from tsunamis (e.g. Suppasri et al 
2013). 
4.4 Phase 3: Decision phase 
The implementation of the previously summarized approach allows for the verification of 
a number of possible decision criteria. Compared to deterministic practices, it has the 
advantage of explicitly accounting for various sources of uncertainty and, therefore, 
rendering possible an effective disaggregation of risk. Also, it can go well beyond an 
analysis that focuses on expected values and lay out the full probability distribution of 
system states and consequences. 
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Based on 20 million full year-long simulations of the dam-reservoir system and 
downstream areas, an F-N curve characterizing the volume of collapsed or washed away 
buildings due to the failure of the conceptual dam under study exemplifies what kind of 
results can and should be derived from the proposed probabilistic framework (Fig. 4.5). 
Naturally, such a curve can be extended to loss of life or any other criterion that is 
considered relevant. 
Detailed losses associated with deterministic scenarios are useful for decision making 
and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. As such, it is not proposed that 
they are replaced by probabilistic approaches. Notwithstanding, in the face of the 
additional information that the latter can add to traditional deterministic safety 
assessments and their enormous potential, it is recommended that probabilistic 
approaches are employed and developed further. 
 
Fig. 4.5  F-N curve based on collapsed or washed away built volume following a dam 
failure upstream (Pitilakis et al 2016) 
4.5 Phase 4: Report phase 
Reporting based on analyses complemented with probabilistic frameworks such as the 
one tested within STREST have the advantage of being apt to attribute probability to 
losses and, thus, lead to formal risk estimations. 
An example of formally framed risk that can be included in a report is the expected 
damages such as those illustrated in Fig. 4.6. 
Going further than that, one can present results that draw from the full probabilistic 
distribution of damages. In Fig. 4.7, the probability of states of interest (buildings 
collapsed of washed away), not necessarily being those with greater probability of 
occurrence, is given. Evidently, reporting is not bound – nor should it be – limited to 
such damage states. Examples would be loss of life probabilities or information on flood 
timing (Fig. 4.8). 
Perhaps most relevantly, it is recommended that reports contain objective evaluations of 
the uncertainty of the presented results and detailed sensitivity analyses that support 
them. 
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Fig. 4.6  Most likely damage to 3 or more stories reinforced concrete buildings in the 
event of a dam failure upstream. Adapted from Pitilakis et al (2016) 
 
Fig. 4.7  Return period of buildings collapsing or being washed away as a consequence of 
dam failures. Adapted from Pitilakis et al (2016) 
 
Fig. 4.8  Time to maximum depth 
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4.6 Final notes 
The evaluation of risk for large dams is difficult due to a number of reasons: generally 
dam systems are complex and there are many sources of uncertainty involved in their 
evaluation; also, the numerical models required for adequate characterization of 
element’s responses and dam-break wave propagations are demanding and 
computationally expensive; above all, the low frequency of the events leading to failure 
goes hand in hand with a fortunately meagre amount of empirical data to be used for 
validation purposes. In essence, it is hard to state with certainty that one assessment 
method is better than any other. 
Deterministic approaches for the safety assessment of large dams have been in use for 
decades, with mostly satisfying results. They should by no means be put aside. Despite 
that, probabilistic approaches – at least conceptually – contain deterministic ones (in 
essence they are probabilistic approaches employing Heaviside cumulative distribution 
functions) and have the potential to go beyond them. In that sense, it is the unwieldy 
nature that ambitious probabilistic frameworks may have (both conceptual and in terms 
of computational requirements), the fact that they easily expose information gaps, and 
the reluctance to change a common practice that has mostly been proven effective that 
continues to justify the reliance on deterministic frameworks. 
The work focusing on large dams that was undertaken under STREST has been an 
attempt to show how some of the unwieldiness that is associated to probabilistic 
frameworks can be mastered. More, it has shown that, in the presence of realistic inputs, 
formal estimates of risk can be produced and the probability distribution of losses 
characterized. Today, it is possible to account for hazard inter-actions, “intra-actions” 
and coincidences, as well as for not only aleatoric, but also epistemic uncertainties. 
Naturally, though the analysis of simulation results it is possible to pinpoint the largest 
contributors to risk in a large dam system and inform appropriate action. 
Moving from deterministic to increasingly probabilistic frameworks in large dam safety 
assessments is a difficult endeavour that will most likely take time; methodologies 
should be adapted, computational models updated, and (the many) data gaps filled. It is 
believed, however, that the advantages of embracing the probabilistic view are many 
and, at least on the long run, its disadvantages few. 
Application of stress test concepts to large dams in the Valais region of Switzerland 
 33 
 
5. Application of stress test concepts to major hydrocarbon 
pipelines, Turkey 
The proposed stress test procedure is implemented to the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) 
major hydrocarbon pipeline in Turkey. Following the ST@STREST main phases, that is, 
Pre-assessment, Assessment, Decision, and Report, the seismic risk of BTC pipeline 
exposed to the fault offsets in Turkey is assessed. 
5.1 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
The pre-assessment phase includes three steps: data collection, risk measures and 
objectives, and set-up of the stress test. Firstly, the main participants of the risk 
assessment team are selected: the project manager (PM) selects the technical integrator 
(TI) and the internal reviewer (IR) whereas TI and PM jointly select the evaluation team 
(ET). The technical integrator, with the technical assistance of ET, collects data about the 
major seismic hazard levels that are likely to affect the pipeline as well as the 
mechanical properties of the BTC pipeline. The data collection also includes major 
mechanical properties of BTC pipeline as well as critical pipeline components that are 
likely to be affected from the target hazard levels. 
 
Fig. 5.1  Overview of BTC pipeline 
As the transmission pipeline, the investigated BTC pipeline (Fig. 5.1), is 1758 km long 
with a daily oil transportation of world's 1% daily petroleum output (about 1 million 
barrels). The BTC pipeline yearly natural gas excess capacity (as of today) is 30 billion 
cubic meters (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan-Pipeline). The pipeline 
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diameter is 42 inches throughout most of Azerbaijan and Turkey. The pipeline diameter 
scales up to 46 inches in Georgia and reduces to 34 inches for the last downhill section 
to the Ceyhan Marine Terminal in Turkey. The BTC pipeline facilities include: 8 pump 
stations (2 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Georgia, 4 in Turkey), 2 intermediate pigging stations, 1 
pressure reduction station and 101 small block valves. 
The transmission pipeline features high quality continuous buried pipes. Unlike water 
pipelines, which are generally constructed as segmented pipes, the continuous steel 
pipelines are more likely to suffer damage due to permanent fault displacements (PFDs) 
rather than ground strains caused by seismic wave propagation. Therefore, the fault 
displacement (offset) induced by earthquakes is defined as the target hazard. Five main 
pipe-fault crossing locations are identified along the BTC route for PFD hazard. The 
hazard information (e.g. fault name, fault length, style-of-faulting, fault geometry, etc.) 
as well as normalized locations of pipe-fault crossings (l/L, as referred to STREST D6.1 
Pitilakis et al 2016), pipe-fault crossing angles, etc. are collected at these pipe-fault 
intersections. The pipe cross sections at these five locations have the same pipe 
diameter (42 inches or 1.0688m) and the same thickness (20.62mm). The mechanical 
properties of the pipe and the soil conditions surrounding the pipe at the fault-pipe 
intersections of interest are also identified as part of data collection phase because they 
are essential for the calculation of pipeline strains. 
The pipeline rupture or loss of pressure integrity (pipeline failure) along BTC pipeline due 
to fault offsets is identified as the risk measure. The risk objectives of the BTC pipeline 
are determined from the Guidelines for the Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade of Water 
Transmission Facilities (Eidinger and Avila 1999). In reference to the risk grading system 
proposed in STREST D5.1 (Esposito et al. 2016), pipeline failure at different probabilities 
under 2475-year PFD are defined as the risk objective. 
In the test set-up phase, the STREST Level 1a (ST-L1) is selected as the component-
based risk assessment. Level 2a (ST-L2a) is selected at the system level. The penalties 
in the stress tests (Pitilakis et al. 2016) due to modelling deficiencies of pipeline are 
disregarded at all levels. Modelling uncertainties (fault mapping accuracy and fault 
complexity) affecting the seismic hazard are accounted for during the computation of 
probabilistic PFD. 
5.2 Phase 2: Assessment phase 
The assessment phase comprises of two main steps: component level assessment (ST-
L1) and system level assessment (ST-L2). The component level assessment considers 
hazard-based (ST-L1a) and design-based (ST-L1b) levels whereas risk-based 
assessment (ST-L2a) is done at the system level. 
In the hazard-based assessment, the 2475-year fault displacements at five pipe-fault 
crossings are computed from the Monte-Carlo based probabilistic PFD hazard (Pitilakis et 
al 2016) and are compared with the prescribed ALA (2001, 2005) hazard requirements. 
The 2475-year PFD hazard level is the recommended hazard level for continuous 
pipelines by the pipe seismic design provisions in ALA (2001, 2005). The comparisons 
indicate that of the five pipe-fault crossings, the computed 2475-year PFD hazard at #2, 
#3 and #4 pipe-fault crossings are larger than the ALA requirements (Pitilakis et al 
2016). On the other hand, the computed 2475-year PFD hazard at #1 and #5 pipe-fault 
crossing are in compliance with the ALA requirements. 
The tensile pipe strain under the computed 2475-year PFD (design level PFD for pipeline) 
is compared with the allowable tensile pipeline strain provided in ALA seismic guidelines 
(2001, 2005). The allowable tensile pipe strain is designated as 3% in the ALA seismic 
pipeline design provisions (2001, 2005). The comparisons are done for all five pipe-fault 
crossings and the tensile strains at these pipe-fault crossings comply with the code 
requirements (Pitilakis et al 2016). 
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In the risk-based assessment at system level, the seismic risk of pipeline failure is 
evaluated by comparing the annual exceedance rate of pipeline failure with the 
suggested allowable pipeline failure rates in the literature. 
The probabilistic pipeline seismic risk against fault rupture is achieved by integrating the 
probabilistic fault displacement hazard, mechanical response of pipe due to fault 
displacement and empirical pipe fragility function (Cheng and Akkar 2016). The concept 
is similar to the conventional probabilistic seismic risk assessment (McGuire 2004). Since 
both tensile and compressive strains developed along the pipe during an earthquake can 
cause pipe failure, the seismic risk of pipe failure should consider the aggregated effects 
of these two strain components. The formula to calculate the seismic risk are proposed 
and is given in STREST D6.1 (Pitilakis et al 2016). The annual failure probability (Pf) for 
pipelines at fault crossings is computed for different pipe-fault crossing angles, i.e.,, 
associated with the uncertainty over  to manifest the inherent complications during the 
fault rupture process. The inaccuracy in fault-pipe crossing angle is modelled by a 
truncated normal probability with alternative standard deviations of 2.5 and 5. 
The literature is limited in addressing the expected performance of steel pipelines 
transmitting gas or oil under extreme events. Honegger and Wijewickreme (2013) 
suggest annual failure rates less than 1/24750 (4.04E-5) as the acceptable rates for 
pipelines under seismic loading. The same limit is also used in the current US building 
standards (ASCE 2010) as the target annual probability against building collapse under 
earthquake-induced loads. We also used the same annual failure rate for probabilistic 
risk-based pipeline assessment at the five designated pipe-fault crossings (STREST 
D6.1; Pitilakis et al 2016). The comparisons of allowable annual pipe failure rate (4.04E-
5) with those calculated at each fault pipe-fault crossing indicate that pipe-fault 
crossings #3 and #4 are not safe as their computed failure rates are larger than the 
allowable annual failure rate. The hazard at these fault crossings is relatively higher with 
respect to the other three pipe-fault crossings that might explain the higher failure rates 
(STREST D6.1; Pitilakis et al 2016). The pipe-fault crossing angles are low at these pipe-
fault crossings that also make the pipe segments more vulnerable to the accumulation of 
tensile strains. 
The pipeline annual failure rates at the five pipe-fault crossings are used to compute the 
aggregated failure risk along the whole BTC pipeline to complete the probabilistic risk 
assessment at system level (ST-L2). To this end, two marginal probabilities are 
computed: (a) perfect correlation between pipe failures at the five pipe-fault crossings 
(Pfc) and (b) independent pipe failures at the five pipe-fault crossings (Pfi). The 
aggregated risk is defined as the annual exceedance probability of the pipeline failure 
(Pf). 
Using the theory described in STREST D6.1 (Pitilakis et al 2016), the aggregated 
marginal failure probabilities of BTC pipeline (i.e., perfect correlation and independent 
failures) exposed to 2475-year PFD hazard are very high. The computed failure 
probabilities range between 40% to 50% (see details in Pitilakis et al 2016). According 
to the grading system in Esposito et al (2016), the pipeline risk in the project falls in to 
Grade B: possibly unjustifiable risk. These calculations conclude that there is a need of 
retrofitting the pipes at pipe-fault crossings. 
5.3 Phase 3: Decision phase 
The probabilistic pipe failure risk assessment yield higher probabilities of pipe failure at 
#3 and #4 pipe-fault crossings. Therefore, the pipeline segments at #3 and #4 pipe-
fault crossings are identified as critical components to the aggregated BTC pipeline 
failure risk. Thus, these pipe segments are selected to be retrofitted. We also decided to 
reconsider the pipe-fault crossing angle uncertainty at pipe-fault intersection #5. Pipeline 
under compression would result in larger damage when pipe-fault crossing angle is 
Application of stress test concepts to major hydrocarbon pipelines, Turkey 
36  
 
larger than 90, which might be the case under the consideration of pipe-fault crossing 
angle uncertainty at intersection #5. 
The effective retrofitting of the pipeline segments at these three pipe-fault crossings is to 
change the pipe-fault intersection angle. Therefore, in the risk mitigation strategies, we 
change the intersection angles of all these three pipe-fault intersection angles to around 
80o. The resulting aggregated risk probability of the BTC pipeline failure due to fault 
displacement is given in Table 5.1. The reduction in pipeline failure risk is evident when 
compared to the current pipe failure probability that is around 40% to 50%. Considering 
the marginal correlations of the pipe failure risk at each fault crossing, the probability of 
BTC pipeline failure due to fault offset is at the most 2% under 2475-year PFD. 
According to the grading system proposed in the stress test, the BTC pipeline risk after 
the proposed mitigation strategy is Grade AA: negligible. 
Table 5.1  Aggregated failure probability of BTC pipeline under 2475-year PFD hazard 
before and after the risk mitigation strategies 
 
Pfc 
(perfectly correlated case) 
Pfi 
(statistically independent case) 
Before retrofit 38.56% 51% 
After retrofit 0.775% 2.206% 
5.4 Phase 4: Report phase 
The outcomes of the stress test for BTC pipeline are presented to the CI authorities and 
the regulator. The presentation is organized and performed by the Project Manager (PM) 
and Technical Integrator (TI). The followings brief the main contents of the presentation. 
The seismic risk of BTC pipeline at the fault crossings is graded as B at the system level 
assessment, according to the grading system for the global outcome of the stress test 
(as shown in Fig. 2.3). Grade B is defined as “possibly unjustifiable risk”. All five fault 
crossings contribute to this risk but the #3 and #4 fault crossings that are located on the 
North Anatolian fault zone and Deliler fault zone are identified as the critical 
components. As pipe-fault crossing angle is an important parameter in pipeline risk 
mitigation imposed by permanent fault offsets, the proposed plan is to change the pipe-
fault intersection angle at the most critical pipe-fault crossings. In essence, the pipe 
segments at the fault crossings #3, #4 and #5 are decided to be retrofitted by changing 
their pipe-fault intersection angles from 30o, 40o, and 90o to 80o. Note that the pipe 
segment at the intersection #5 with the design pipe-fault crossing angle () of 90o is 
changed to 80o to consider the uncertainty in  due to fault mapping inaccuracy. A small 
deviation in  arising from the modelling deficiency of mapped faults may result in pipe-
fault crossings larger than 90o that would yield critical compressive strains at the pipe 
cross-section. The change in  at the fault crossings #3, #4 and #5 marks the risk grade 
as AA that corresponds to “negligible” risk in the BTC pipeline. 
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6. Application of stress test concepts to Gasunie national 
gas storage and distribution network, Holland 
6.1 Introduction 
The Groningen field is a large natural gas field located in the northern Netherlands, 
contributing to approximately half of the natural gas production in the Netherlands. On- 
and offshore natural gas production and distribution is the key component of the national 
energy supply in the Netherlands. The gas distribution relies on a major gas pipeline 
infrastructure, with a total length of over 12000 km of installed pipes in. The production 
from the Groningen field and other natural gas fields mostly located in the north east 
part of the country supply the Dutch economy and major export across Europe, via 
cross-border long distance gas pipelines (European Natural Gas Round-About). 
Located in an area of very low tectonic seismicity, gas extraction in the region has led to 
an increase in seismicity since the early 1990s and in particular after 2003. Initially, this 
increase, including the 2006 earthquake near Westeremden with a magnitude ML = 3.4 
was considered to be a statistical variation within the uncertainty range of the 
measurements. A renewed focus on the issue of seismicity induced by gas production in 
Groningen started in 2012 triggered by the earthquake near Huizinge (16th August 
2012) with magnitude ML=3.6. It was felt as more intense and with a longer duration 
than previous earthquakes in that area and significantly more building damage was 
reported as a result of this earthquake. It materialized into the realization that over the 
past few years seismicity in the Groningen area had increased beyond statistical 
variation. It was realized that the earthquakes could pose a potential safety risk 
(WINN_TA-NAM 2016). 
The current chapter describes the application of the stress test methodology to part of 
the main gas distribution network of Gasunie Gas Transport Services (Gasunie-GTS). The 
case consists of a distributed and geographically extended infrastructure with potentially 
high economic and environmental impact. 
6.2 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
6.2.1 Data collection 
For the case study, a sub-network is selected located in the induced earthquake prone 
area, directly above the main gas field (Fig. 6.1). The sub-network selected covers an 
area of approximately 3360 km2. It contains 4 MPa (40 bar) to 8 MPa (80 bar) main gas 
transmission pipes, with a total length in the order of 1000 km. Different pipe diameters 
are present within this sub-network ranging from 114 millimetres (4 in) to 1219 mm 
(48 in). Apart from 426 valve stations, it contains compressor stations, measure and 
regulations stations, reducing stations and a mixing station (11 in total). With respect to 
the end nodes of the sub-network: 15 feeding stations and 91 receiving stations are 
accounted for, the latter being sub-divided into approximately 40 industrial, 50 municipal 
and 1 export. 
Application of stress test concepts to Gasunie national gas storage and distribution 
network, Holland 
38  
 
 
Fig. 6.1  Selected sub system of the gas distribution network (right) located above main 
natural gas field (top left) 
GIS databases were obtained from Gasunie-GTS with properties of the pipeline system: 
coordinates, diameter, wall-thickness, material, yield stress, maximum operational 
pressure and depth of soil cover. As the database originally contained 6378 unique 
valued combinations of diameter, wall-thickness, yield stress and pressure, these 
properties were first classified into groups in order to reduce the number of unique sets. 
This resulted in 136 different pipe configurations composed out of the following values: 
o 12 diameter values: from 114 to 1219 mm; 
o 39 wall thicknesses: from 4 to 31.5 mm; 
o 5 yield strength values: from 241 to 483 MPa; 
o 3 operational pressures: 40, 66 and 80 bar. 
An example of the modelled network layout, showing different pipe diameters is 
presented in Fig. 6.2. 
Fig. 6.3 shows the locations and types of stations that are included in the network 
modelled. Apart from source and demand stations as end nodes, in between nodes are 
shown and labelled as M&R (measure and regulation stations). Although labelled only as 
M&R, they in fact stand for compressor stations, measure and regulations stations, 
reducing stations or a mixing station. Values next to these stations indicate the number 
of pipes that are connected to the site of the station. 
The target hazard is the seismic hazard as a result of the gas extraction from the 
Groningen gas field. Numerous studies have been performed over the past several years 
and are still on-going leading to more and more refined models dedicated to the 
Groningen area. In the current stress test one of the earlier versions is being adopted. 
The seismic model adopted consists of the following: 
Seismic zonation: The so-called Z1 model from Dost et al (2013) dividing the area in 4 
zones. 
Ground motion prediction equation (GMPE): The Akkar et al (2014) modified GMPE 
model (Bommer 2013). 
Magnitude distribution: The classical Gutenberg-Richter (GR) relation. 
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Maximum magnitude: In the context of the stress test analysis, a value of 6.0 is applied, 
although ongoing studies indicate a value of 5. 
Annual event rate: The annual event rate for events with M≥1.5 is set to 30 events per 
year (Dost et al 2013), although current studies tend to a value of 23. 
The zonation and corresponding values for the magnitude and frequency distributions 
are shown in Fig. 6.4 and Table 6.1. 
 
Fig. 6.2  Distribution of pipe diameters (mm) present in the modelled sub network (black 
lines on background indicate the earthquake zones) 
 
Fig. 6.3  Locations of stations in the modelled sub network: source stations (green) 
demand stations (red) and M&R stations (blue). Pipeline colours and colour bar refer to 
the pressures ([bar]) in the pipe sections 
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Fig. 6.4  Division of Groningen area in seismic zones (Dost et al 2013) 
Table 6.1  Gutenberg-Richter parameters (Dost et al 2013) 
Zone Number Description a b Mmin-Mmax 
1 Background 0.364 1 1.5-6 
2 Eastern block 0.017 1 1.5-6 
3 Central North 0.498 0.8 1.5-6 
4 Central South 0.121 1 1.5-6 
6.2.2 Risk measures and objectives 
Serviceability Ratio (SR) and Connectivity Loss (CL) are used as risk measures (Esposito 
2011). 
The Serviceability Ratio (SR) is directly related to the number of demand nodes (n) in 
the utility network, which remain accessible from at least one source node following an 
earthquake. It is computed according to Eq. 6.1: 
 SR =   
∑ wi Xi 
n
i=1
∑ wi 
n
i=1
 (6.1) 
In which Xi represents the functionality of facility (demand node) i, which is modelled as 
the outcome of a Bernoulli trial (Xi = 1 if the facility is accessible from at least one 
supply facility or source node), and wi is a weighting factor assigned to demand node i. 
Connectivity Loss (CL) measures the average reduction in the ability of endpoints to 
receive flow from sources counting the number of the sources connected to the i-th 
demand node in the original (undamaged) network (Nisource,orig) and then in the possible 
damaged network (Nisource,dam) after an earthquake event. It is expressed by the following 
equation: 
 𝐶𝐿 = 1 − 〈
𝑁𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒,𝑑𝑎𝑚
𝑖
𝑁𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒,𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔
𝑖 〉 (6.2) 
where () denotes averaging over all demand nodes. 
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An as low as reasonable practicable (ALARP) grade of the risk measures is targeted for 
the existing gas transport network to pass the stress test (Jonkman et al 2003). 
In the Netherlands a standard for quantified risk assessment (QRA) exists, known as 
“the coloured books”. They were issued by the national “Committee for the Prevention of 
Disasters” (CPR) and describe the methods to be used for modelling and quantifying the 
risks associated with dangerous materials (CPR 18E, 1999). Installations, types and 
frequencies of loss of containment (LOC), calculation methods, risk acceptance criteria 
and even the computer program to use are prescribed. 
Currently the computer program CAROLA (CAROLA, 2010) is used for these calculations 
in the Netherlands, which is based on PIPESAFE (Acton et al, 2002). 
In the current application of the stress test methodology to the Gasunie-GTS case, no 
full QRA was performed for the 1000 km sub-network. However, values for the annual 
failure rates originally prescribed in the purple book (CPR 18E, 1999) and adjusted 
values nowadays used for the Gasunie network in CAROLA are selected to define grade 
boundaries (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Grading boundaries (failure frequencies) for stations and pipe sections 
Boundary Pipe [yr-1km-1] Station [yr-1] 
AA-A 8 10-6 8 10-6 
A-B 6 10-5 6 10-5 
B-C 1.4 10-4 1.4 10-4 
Using these boundary values for the grading system enables the asset owner Gasunie-
GST to relate the outcome of the stress test to his own QRA’s as performed with CAROLA 
with non-earthquake related failure frequencies. 
For illustrative purposes only, indicative grading boundaries are attributed to the values 
of the performance parameter connectivity loss (CL). The boundaries used are taken 
from Esposito et al (2016b). No actual calibrations for these bounds with respect to 
economic loss or fatalities exist yet for the sub-network at hand and the grading is 
indicative and provisional. 
6.2.3 Set-up of the stress test 
In the Gasunie case the Stress Test has been performed up till level ST-L2a with the 
earthquakes as single hazard. 
ST-L1 considers individual components. A risk based approach is applied for individual 
stations and pipe segments making use of the ST-L2a results. 
For Level ST-L2a a full Probabilistic Risk Analysis using Monte Carlo simulations is 
performed for the network analysis. 
No scenario-based assessments are performed on component or network level. 
Accuracy levels targeted are classified as Advanced. Detailed information and advanced 
methods are being used in the stress test. The method adopted for the component level 
assessment is risk-based while the System level is performed according to the 
performance-based earthquake engineering (PBEE) framework (Weatherill et al 2014). 
Site specific hazard analyses are being performed and structure specific fragility 
functions being used. Although the team performing the Stress test did not actively 
participate themselves in the on-going research into the man induced seismicity in the 
Groningen area, use is made of the outcomes of these studies by, among others, the 
NAM, KNMI, TNO and Deltares as well as by an international community of experts 
(WINN_TA-NAM 2016). 
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6.3 Phase 2: Assessment phase 
6.3.1 Component level assessment (ST-L1a) 
Sampled results (failure, no failure) per component from the Mont Carlo analysis of the 
network analysis are used to calculate annual failure frequencies for pipes and stations. 
For the pipe sections the resulting values are presented as a contour plot in Fig. 6.5 
whereas corresponding values for the stations are shown in Fig. 6.6. 
6.3.2 System level assessment for single hazard (ST-L2a) 
The methodology for the evaluation of seismic performance of the network under study 
consists of five major steps: 
o Seismic hazard assessment of the region considering gas depletion as source of 
the seismic activities.  
o Evaluation of the PGA, PGV and displacement (liquefaction) hazard, in order to 
estimate the seismic demand. 
o Seismic demand evaluation at each facility and the pipe sections within the 
network to obtain the failure probability using appropriate fragility curves. 
o Vulnerability analysis through the use of a connectivity algorithm to integrate the 
damage of facilities and pipe sections into the damage of the system. 
o Probabilistic risk assessment of the case study using Monte Carlo simulation in 
terms of mean functionality and annual exceedance curve. 
OOFIMS software was used as a basis, kindly provided by the Sapienza - University of 
Rome, Dept. of Structural & Geotechnical Engineering (Franchin et al 2011). A new class 
for modelling the gas network was added for this study. 
Fragility functions 
The probabilities of soil liquefaction as a function of PGA values  
The probability of soil liquefaction was investigated for soil conditions in the Groningen 
Area. The study is based on the Idriss-Boulanger model (Idriss and Boulanger 2008) and 
is described in more detail in (Miraglia et al 2015). Two soil profiles based on CPT tests 
were analysed by describing the soil properties as stochastic parameters and sampling 
the liquefaction response of the layers with earthquake events. The sampling results 
eventually were summarized as a fragility curve as a function of PGA values (see Fig. 
6.7). 
The probability of pipe failure, given soil liquefaction occurred (permanent seismic load 
effects) 
Soil liquefaction can cause permanent displacements, expressing themselves in lateral 
displacements and or settlements. Besides that, depending on the weight of the pipe 
segments relative to the volumetric weight of the liquefied soil, pipe segments will start 
floating or sinking due to gravity. From these three aspects only the latter is considered: 
substantial lateral spread is not expected in the flat Groningen area, settlements are 
assumed to be confined to dozens of centimetres, whereas uplift due to buoyancy can 
reach the value of the soil cover depth. 
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Fig. 6.5  ST-L1a: annual failure frequencies (per km) for the pipe sections 
 
Fig. 6.6  ST-L1a: annual failure frequencies for the stations 
Structural reliability calculations are performed for each of the 136 pipe configurations 
(distinct sets of values for diameter, wall thickness, yield stress and gas pressure). In 
these calculations the pipe properties are treated as stochastic variables. The limit state 
function is formulated as the von Mises stress due to gas pressure as well as bending 
due to uplift against the yield stress. The bending stress due to uplift was calculated in a 
mechanical model in which the pipe is embedded in stiff soil at its endings and is allowed 
to uplift towards ground level. The length of the pipe in liquefied soil is adjusted during 
the limit state evaluations such that this maximum value (cover depth) is reached. Gas 
pressure is modelled as a normal distribution with a 10% coefficient of variation. 
Diameter, wall thickness and yield stress are log-normally distributed with variation 
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coefficients of respectively 3, 3 and 7 %. Finally, also the soil cover depth is modelled 
stochastically: normal distributed with a mean value of 1.5 m and 20% coefficient of 
variation. FORM analyses were performed for each situation (pipe configuration) and 
reliability indices (β) are calculated as a proxy for the probability of failure given liquefied 
soil. Fig. 6.8 graphically depicts the distribution of the different values found for the 
different pipe sections. 
Length effects of liquefaction-related pipe failure will, in the OOFIMS tool, be taken into 
account by assuming a correlation length of 200 m along the pipe. 
 
Fig. 6.7  Soil liquefaction fragilities of two soil profiles in the Groningen area (Miraglia et 
al 2015) 
 
Fig. 6.8  Distribution of reliability indices for failure due to soil liquefaction for different 
pipe sections 
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The probability of pipe failure as a function of PGV values (transient seismic load effects) 
For transient load effects structural reliability calculations are performed for different 
pipe geometries with a limit state based on Newmark’s shear wave formulae of seismic 
strain for buried pipelines. In addition stresses due to gas pressure and due to initial 
curvatures in the pipeline stretches are accounted for. The same stochastic parameters 
as above are used for diameter, wall thickness, pressure and yield stress are used. The 
curvature is modelled as a lognormal distribution with mean 2000 m and 100 m standard 
deviation. In addition the shear wave velocity Vs30 is modelled as a lognormal stochastic 
variable having a mean of 200 m/s and a standard deviation 20 m/s.  
Again, FORM analyses were performed for each situation (pipe configuration) with 
different values of seismic load PGV. Thus fragility curves are derived which are 
presented in Fig. 6.9. In this figure also a fragility curve from Lanzano et al (2013) is 
presented for reference. It shows the current fragility curves to be on the conservative 
side. 
Length effects of transient loading related pipe failure are modelled by implementing a 
repair rate model according to ALA (2001): 
 
Fig. 6.9  Calculated pipe fragilities with respect to transient seismic load effects. Different 
solid lines correspond to different pipe properties. The red dotted line is taken from 
Lanzano et al (2013) 
The probability of station failure as a function of PGA values 
For the stations existing fragility curves have been selected  (NIBS, 2004). The one 
selected corresponds to a moderate damage state and is described as a lognormal 
cumulative distribution with a mean of 2.4 m/s2 and a coefficient of variation of 60%. 
The moderate damage state is selected as it is the first damage state with such 
malfunctioning that it leads to connectivity loss and a decrease in serviceability ratio. 
Besides this, the station types vary between compressor stations, measure and 
regulations stations, reducing stations or a mixing station. All with different mechanical 
and or electrical components and some sheltered in one story masonry buildings and 
others in open air. Choosing the moderate damage state is partly motivated by selecting 
a conservative envelope for all types. 
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Probabilistic risk assessment 
Seismicity, network, and network properties are modelled with the OOFIMS tool and 
Monte Carlo simulations are performed. Network performance in terms of connectivity 
loss (CL) and serviceability ratio (SR) were defined as the primary indicators in the 
stress test. 
Fig. 6.10 (top graph) shows the performance of the network in terms of the annual 
probability of exceedance for the connectivity loss (CL). The results show a good 
performance with respect to CL: the annual probability of having a connectively loss of 
e.g. 50% or more is 3.6 10-5. 
Annual exceedance frequencies for the serviceability ratio (SR) are presented in the 
bottom graph of Fig. 6.10. It shows very high exceedance frequencies for all values of 
the serviceability ratio, with only a drop at the very end of the horizontal axis near SR 
reaching one. Hence it shows a high robustness of the network, indicating a vast 
redundancy in possible paths between demand and source nodes. 
 
Fig. 6.10  Annual probability of exceedance for network connectivity loss CL (top) and 
network serviceability rate SR (bottom) 
6.4 Phase 3: Decision phase 
6.4.1 Risk objectives check 
An “as low as reasonable practicable (ALARP)” grade of the risk was targeted for the gas 
transport network to pass the stress test.  
With the component results from section 6.3.1 and the grading boundaries from section 
6.2.2, the following results are obtained for the pipe sections and the stations: 
o Pipe sections: Most pipe sections obtain grade AA, some obtain grade A. The pipe 
sections pass the stress test. 
o Stations: Most stations are classified with grade AA or A. Some, near or within the 
seismic zone, obtain grade B. The stations partly pass the stress test. 
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Fig. 6.11  Obtained grading for the individual pipelines (Mmax = 6; annual rate =30) 
 
Fig. 6.12  Obtained grading for the stations (Mmax = 6; annual rate =30) 
The grading results for pip segments and stations are presented in Fig. 6.11 and Fig. 
6.12. 
Fig. 6.13 presents the values for the connectivity loss relative to the indicative grading 
boundaries. The network performance complies with grade AA and passes the stress 
test. 
These findings are obtained despite a number of conservative assumptions made with 
respect to fragilities. Also the seismic demand was modelled in a conservative way with a 
maximum magnitude of 6 and a b-value of 0.8 for seismic zone 3 in the Gutenberg-
Richter model. 
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Fig. 6.13  Exceedance frequencies for connectivity loss relative to (indicative) grading 
boundaries. 
6.4.2 Disaggregation/sensitivity analysis 
Disaggregation analyses were performed with respect to seismic events (magnitudes and 
zones), pipe components and stations. 
First network performance losses (CL>0.1) are found from M>3.5 onwards and for 
extreme values of performance losses (CL>0.9) a substantial contribution from seismic 
zone 4 is observed. 
Pipe sections, which have a major contribution to performance loss, were identified by 
selecting events with a low performance loss (CL<=0.1). Specific pipe sections to the 
South-West and North-East of seismic zone 3 were localized. 
As all stations are modelled with the same fragility functions the only discriminate factor 
in selecting the most vulnerable ones would be their distance with respect to possible 
seismic sources, see Fig. 6.6. Combined with the number of pipe connections at the 
corresponding interconnecting stations as shown in Fig. 6.3 their possible contribution to 
the network performance loss can be identified. 
With respect to sensitivity analysis the impact on network performance of the maximum 
event magnitude as well as the impact of the value for the annual event rate was 
investigated. 
With respect to the component grading it holds that confining the maximum events to 
M=5 leads to all stations being in either grade A or AA. Likewise, when the annual rate is 
set to 23 per year, no more stations being in state are found. 
6.4.3 Guidelines and critical events 
With respect to the network as a whole, a strong redundancy in the paths from demand 
to source nodes is taken into account. This is a strong feature for obtaining the stress 
test results. 
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With respect to components, both types (pipe sections and stations) are found to 
contribute evenly to the network performance indicators as can also be concluded from 
the component level assessments. From these: 
 Specific pipe sections can to some extend be identified as being a weakest link in 
the network. These sections should be checked on their current actual state 
assessing the need for upgrading. 
 For the stations a rather strong assumption is made with respect to the fragility 
curve adopted. These should be quantified in more detail and depending to 
findings retrofitting of stations might be necessary. 
In the current analysis soil liquefaction is the dominant failure mechanism. As much 
uncertainty still exists in the liquefaction fragilities for the Groningen area, further 
studies into these fragilities and their geographical distribution is recommended. 
6.5 Phase 4: Report phase 
The stress test is performed as being initiated by the asset owner, the Gasunie-GTS. 
Reporting, in terms of the grade, the critical events, the guidelines for risk mitigation, 
and the accuracy of the methods adopted in the stress test is accomplished by the 
current report. 
In summary the stress test results are presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Stress test results for Gasunie-GTS sub-network 
Item Mmax NM>1.6 Grading Result 
Pipes sections 6 30 AA, A Pass 
Stations 
6 30 AA, A, B Partly pass 
5 30 AA, A Pass 
6 23 AA, A Pass 
Network CL 6 30 AA Pass 
 
In addition to this report, a presentation will be given at the Gasunie-GTS. 
Hence, no formal presentation of the outcome of the stress test to (other) CI authorities 
and/or regulators is foreseen. 
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7. Application of stress test concepts to port 
infrastructures of Thessaloniki, Greece 
ST@STREST is applied and tested in the port of Thessaloniki, one of the most important 
ports in Southeast Europe and the largest transit-trade port in Greece, a characteristic 
example of distributed and/or geographically extended infrastructures with potentially 
high economic and environmental impact. The port occupies a total space of 1.5 million 
m2, includes 6 piers spreading on a 6200 m long quay and a sea depth down to 12 m, 
with open and indoors storage areas, suitable for servicing all types of cargo and 
passenger traffic. The port also has installations for liquid fuel storage, while is located in 
proximity to the international natural-gas pipeline and is linked to the national and 
international road and railway network (www.thpa.gr). The goal of this study is to apply 
the ST@STREST framework to the port infrastructures exposed to different seismic 
hazards i.e. ground shaking, liquefaction and tsunami. The framework consists of four 
phases: Pre-Assessment, Assessment, Decision and Report phase, which are performed 
in sequence. Each phase is subdivided in a number of specific steps (Fig. 7.1). 
 
Fig. 7.1  Flowchart of the ST@STREST framework for the stress test application in the 
port of Thessaloniki 
7.1 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
7.1.1 Data collection 
A GIS database for the port facilities was developed by the Research Unit of Soil 
Dynamics and Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering (SDGEE, sdgee.civil.auth.gr) at 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in collaboration with the port Authority in the 
framework of previous national and European projects and it is further updated in 
STREST project (www.strest-eu.org). Waterfront structures, cargo handling equipment, 
buildings (offices, sheds, warehouses etc.) and the electric power supply system are 
examined (Fig. 7.2). The SYNER-G (www.syner-g.eu, Pitilakis et al 2014a) taxonomy is 
used to describe the different typologies. Waterfront structures include concrete gravity 
block type quay walls with simple surface foundation and non-anchored components. 
Cargo handling equipment has non-anchored components without backup power supply. 
Four gantry cranes are used for container loading-unloading services located in the 
western part of the 6th pier. The electric power supply to the cranes is assumed to be 
provided through non-vulnerable lines from the distribution substations that are present 
inside the port facilities. They are classified as low-voltage substations, with non-
anchored components. In total, 85 building and storage facilities are considered in the 
analyses. The majority is reinforced concrete (RC) buildings comprising principally of 
low- and mid-rise infilled frame and dual systems with low or no seismic design. The 
steel buildings are basically warehouses with one or two floors while the unreinforced 
masonry (URM) buildings are old low-rise and mid-rise structures. 
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Fig. 7.2  Geographical representation of Thessaloniki’s port infrastructures 
Soft alluvial deposits, sometimes susceptible to liquefaction, characterize the Port subsoil 
conditions. The thickness of these deposits close to the sea may reach 150 m to 180 m. 
A comprehensive set of in-situ geotechnical tests (e.g. drillings, sampling, SPT and CPT 
tests), detailed laboratory tests and measurements, as well as geophysical surveys 
(cross-hole, down-hole, array microtremor measurements) at the port broader area 
provide all necessary information to perform any kind of site specific ground response 
analyses (Anastasiadis et al 2001). Complementary geophysical tests including array 
microtremor measurements have been conducted in the frame of STREST project at four 
different sites inside the port (Pitilakis et al 2016) using the SPatial Autocorrelation 
Coefficient–SPAC method (Aki 1957). All available data (Fig. 7.3) are properly archived. 
A topobathymetric model was also produced for the tsunami simulations, based on 
nautical and topographic maps and satellite images. The elevation data includes also the 
buildings and other structures that affect the waves while propagating inland. The 
resolution of the model is higher in the area of the Port. 
 
Fig. 7.3  Location of geotechnical tests and geophysical field measurements in port area 
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Fragility models 
The vulnerability of the Port facilities at component level (i.e. buildings, waterfront 
structures, cranes etc.) is assessed through fragility functions (Pitilakis et al 2014a), 
which describe the probability of exceeding predefined damage states (DS) for given 
levels of peak ground acceleration (PGA), permanent ground displacement (PGD) and 
inundation depth for the ground shaking, liquefaction and tsunami hazards respectively 
(Table 7.1). The fragility functions used to assess the damages due to liquefaction are 
generic (NIBS 2004), while the models used for ground shaking are either case specific 
(UPGRADE 2015; Kappos et al 2003, 2006; SRM-LIFE 2007, present work) or generic 
(NIBS 2004). New seismic fragility curves have been developed for typical quay walls 
and gantry cranes of the port subjected to ground shaking based on dynamic numerical 
analyses in collaboration with the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) 
(UPGRADE 2015). Analytical tsunami fragility curves as a function of inundation depth 
have been developed for representative typologies of the Port RC buildings, warehouses 
and gantry cranes (Karafagka et al 2016; Salzano et al 2015) while, for simplicity 
reasons, the waterfront structures are considered as non-vulnerable to tsunami forces.  
The damage states are correlated with component functionality in order to perform the 
risk assessments in the system level. The following assumptions are set: (i) the 
waterfront-pier (berth) is functional if damage is lower than moderate, (ii) the crane is 
functional if damage is lower than moderate and there is electric power supply (i.e. the 
physical damages of the substations are lower than moderate) (iii) the berth is functional 
if the waterfront and at least one crane is functional. 
Table 7.1  Fragility functions used in the risk analyses 
Hazard Component 
Intensity 
measure 
Reference 
Ground 
shaking 
RC and URM buildings 
PGA 
Kappos et al (2003, 2006) 
Steel buildings HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) 
Waterfront structures 
UPGRADE (2015) Cranes/cargo handling 
equipment 
Electric power substations 
(distribution, transmission) 
HAZUS (NIBS, 2004), 
SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) 
Liquefaction 
Buildings/ Housed electric 
power substations (all 
considered typologies) 
PGD HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) 
Waterfront structures 
Cranes/cargo handling 
equipment 
Tsunami 
RC Buildings/ Electric power 
substations 
Inundation 
depth 
Karafagka et al (2016)  
Salzano et al (2015) 
Warehouses (Steel and URM 
buildings) 
Cranes/cargo handling 
equipment 
7.1.2 Risk measures and objectives 
In the Pre-Assessment phase, specific risk measures and objectives are defined related 
to the functionality of the port at system level and the structural losses at component 
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level. Since two terminals (container, bulk cargo) are assumed herein, the system 
performance is measured through the total number of containers handled (loaded and 
unloaded) per day (TCoH), in Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU), and the total cargo 
handled (loaded and unloaded) per day (TCaH), in tones. Risk measures related to 
structural and economic losses of the buildings are also set for the tsunami case and the 
scenario based assessment. The risk objectives correspond to the boundaries of the 
grading system proposed in ST@STREST (Esposito et al 2017). The CI passes the stress 
test if is classified into grade AA (negligible risk) or A (risk being as low as reasonably 
practicable, ALARP). The CI partly passes the stress test if it receives grade B (possibly 
unjustifiable risk), while it fails the stress test if it is classified into grade C (intolerable 
risk). Since no regulatory boundaries exist for the moment for port facilities, continuous 
(i.e. straight lines on the logarithmic performance curve, see Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6) and 
scalar (i.e. expected performance loss, see Table 7.2) boundaries were defined based on 
general judgment criteria for the probabilistic and scenario based system-wide risk 
assessment respectively in order to demonstrate the application of the ST@STREST. The 
stress test levels are defined and outlined in the following section. 
7.2 Phase 2: Assessment phase 
7.2.1 Component level assessment (ST-L1a) 
The aim is to check each component of the port independently for earthquake and 
tsunami hazards in order to show whether the component passes or fails the pre-defined 
minimum requirements for its performance implied by the current codes. A risk-based 
assessment is performed using the hazard function at the location of the component and 
the fragility function of the component. These two functions are convolved in risk 
integral in order to obtain probability of exceedance of a designated limit state in a 
period of time (Pf). This probability is estimated on the basis of closed form risk equation 
(Fajfar and Dolšek 2012) as follows: 
  (7.1) 
where and β are the median and log-standard deviation values respectively of the 
fragility function, H(IM) is the hazard function and k is the logarithmic slope of the 
hazard function idealized in the following form: 
 H(IM) = ko·IM-k  (7.2) 
where ko is a constant that depends on the seismicity of the site. Proper k and ko can be 
obtained by fitting the actual hazard curve provided that the entire hazard function or at 
least two points from the hazard function are available. For the seismic case (i.e. ground 
shaking), k and ko were computed from the hazard curve corresponding to return periods 
equal to 475 and 4975 years for the normal and the extreme event respectively based 
on the site specific response analyses carried out for three representative soil profiles 
(scenario-based assessment) (e.g. Fig. 7.4- left). For the tsunami case, at least two 
points of the mean hazard function estimated from probabilistic tsunami hazard 
assessment at various locations in the port area were used to estimate these parameters 
(e.g. Fig. 7.4- right). The target (acceptable) probability of exceedance of a designated 
limit state for a period of time implied by the code, stakeholders and decision makers 
(Pt) also has to be defined for each component and different limit states. In this 
application the target probability of exceedance of the collapse damage state is only 
provided. This probability was set to 1.0·10-5 based on the existing practice (e.g. Lazar 
and Dolšek 2013; Silva et al 2014) corresponding to an acceptable probability equal to 
0.05% in 50 years and was properly modified based on EC8 prescriptions to account for 
the importance factor γΙ of the structure. To check whether or not the component is safe 
2 2
H( ) exp(0.5 k )
f
P IM
IM
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against collapse, the target probability (Pt) is compared with the corresponding 
probability of exceeding the ultimate damage state (Pf).  
As an example the proposed performance assessment approach is applied here to a 
strategic building of the Port, the passenger terminal, which is a low-rise infilled dual 
system (γΙ =1.2). The probability of exceeding the ultimate damage state (Pf), which in 
this study corresponds to the collapse damage state, is computed and compared with the 
target probability of collapse (Pt) for both earthquake and tsunami hazards. The hazard 
function at the location of the structure is estimated as 10-5 and 1.7·10-4 for the seismic 
(see Fig. 7.4- left and Eq. (7.2)) and tsunami (see Fig. 7.4- right and Eq. (7.2)) case 
respectively, while the corresponding probabilities of collapse (Pf) are finally computed 
equal to 1.4·10-3 and 2.0·10-4. These probabilities are higher than the target 
(acceptable) probability of collapse (Pt) estimated equal to 4.7·10-6 and 7.9·10-6 for the 
seismic and tsunami case respectively, indicating that the structure is not safe against 
exceedance of the collapse limit state due to the considered hazards. Similar results are 
generally derived for all buildings and infrastructures providing a general assessment of 
the performance and resilience of the Port. 
 
Fig. 7.4  Site specific hazard curves for ground shaking and tsunami 
7.2.2 System level assessment (ST-L2b / L2d / L3d) 
Probabilistic risk assessment (ST-L2b) 
The system wide probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is made separately for ground 
shaking, including liquefaction, and tsunami hazard, according to the methodology 
developed in SYNER-G (Pitilakis et al 2014b) and extended in STREST D4.2 (Kakderi et 
al 2015). The objective is to evaluate the probability or mean annual frequency (MAF) of 
events with the corresponding loss in the performance of the port operations. The 
analysis is based on an object-oriented paradigm where the system is described through 
a set of classes, characterized in terms of attributes and methods, interacting with each 
other. The physical model starts from a pre-defined taxonomy and requires: a) a 
description of the functioning of the system (intra-dependencies) under undisturbed and 
disturbed conditions (i.e., in the damaged state following an event); b) a model for the 
physical and functional damageability of each component (fragility functions); c) 
identification of all dependencies between systems (inter-dependencies); and d) 
definition of adequate Performance Indicators (PIs) for components and the system as a 
whole which represent the previously defined risk metrics. The computational modules 
include the modelling of: hazard events and intensity parameters (hazard class), 
physical damages of components and performance of the system (network class), and 
specific interactions among systems (interdependency models). A Monte Carlo simulation 
is carried out sampling events and corresponding damages for the given hazard. The 
exceedance probability of different levels of performance loss is assessed for the system 
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under the effect of any possible event, and the performance curve is produced, which is 
equivalent of risk curves for non-systemic probabilistic assessments in single (e.g. PEER 
formula; Cornell and Krawinkler 2000) and/or multi-risk (e.g. Selva 2013; Mignan et al 
2014) analysis.  
In the present application the systemic analysis concerns the container and bulk cargo 
movements affected by the performance of the piers, berths, waterfront and 
container/cargo handling equipment (cranes) while the interdependency considered here 
is between the cargo handling equipment and the Electric Power Network (EPN) 
supplying to cranes. The capacity of berths is related to the capacity of cranes (lifts per 
hour/tons per hour). The functionality state of each component and the whole port 
system is assessed based on the computed physical damages, taking also into account 
system inter- and intra-dependencies. Regarding the analysis of the interdependencies 
we assume that if a crane node is not fed by the reference EPN node (i.e. electric supply 
station) with power and the crane does not have a back-up supply, then the crane itself 
is considered out of service. The functionality of the demand node is based on EPN 
connectivity analysis (Pitilakis et al 2014b). 
Risk assessment for ground shaking 
The seismic hazard model provides the means for: (i) sampling events in terms of 
location (epicentre), magnitude and faulting type according to the seismicity of the study 
region and (ii) maps of sampled correlated seismic intensities at the sites of the 
vulnerable components in the infrastructure (“shakefields” method, Weatherill et al 
2014). When the fragility of components is expressed with different IMs, the model 
assesses them consistently. Five seismic zones with Mmin=5.5 and Mmax=7.5 are selected 
based on the results of SHARE European research project (Giardini et al 2013, 
www.share-eu.org) and the ground motion prediction equation (GMPE) of Akkar and 
Bommer (2010) to estimate the outcrop ground motion parameters. Seismic events are 
sampled for the seismic zones affecting the port area through a Monte Carlo simulation 
(10,000 runs). The spatial variability is modelled using the correlation models provided 
by Jayaram and Baker (2009). For each site of a regular grid of points discretizing the 
study area, the averages of primary IM (PGA) from the specified GMPE were calculated, 
and the residual was sampled from a random field of spatially correlated Gaussian 
variables according to the spatial correlation model. The primary IM is then retrieved at 
vulnerable sites by distance-based interpolation and finally the local IM is sampled 
conditionally on primary IM. To scale the hazard to the site condition the amplification 
factors proposed in EC8 (EN 1998-1, 2004) are used in accordance with the site classes 
that were defined in the study area. HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and the modeling procedure 
by Weatherill et al (2014) are applied to estimate the permanent ground displacements 
(PGDs) due to liquefaction.  
The PIs of the port system for both the container and cargo terminal are evaluated for 
each simulation of the Monte Carlo analysis based on the damages and corresponding 
functionality states of each component and considering the interdependencies between 
components. The final computed PIs are normalized to the value referring to normal 
(non-seismic) conditions assuming that all cranes are working at their full capacity 24 
hours per day. Fig. 7.5 shows the MAF of exceedance curves (“performance curve”) for 
TCoH and TCaH. For performance loss values below 40% TCaH yields higher values of 
exceedance frequency, while for performance loss over 40% TCoH yields higher values 
of exceedance frequency. 
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Fig. 7.5  Mean annual frequency (MAF) of exceedance values for the normalized 
performance loss of the container terminal (TCoH, right) and the bulk cargo terminal 
(TCaH, left) for the seismic hazard case.  The green, blue and red continuous lines 
correspond to the boundaries between risk grades AA (negligible), A (ALARP), B 
(possibly unjustifiable risk), and C (intolerable) 
Risk assessment for tsunami 
A full SPTHA (Seismic Probability Tsunami Hazard Analysis) for tsunami of seismic origin, 
following Lorito et al (2015) has been developed, based on inundation simulation of the 
Thessaloniki area (Volpe et al in prep). Different potential tsunamigenic sources should 
be considered, such as earthquakes, landslides, meteorite impacts or atmospheric 
phenomena. Here, we focus only on tsunami of seismic origin, which is in most of cases 
the dominant component (Parsons and Geist 2009). A very large number of numerical 
simulations of tsunami generation, propagation and inundation on high-resolution topo-
bathymetric models are in principle required, in order to give a robust evaluation of 
SPTHA at a local site. To reduce the computational cost, while keeping results stable and 
consistent with respect to explore the full variability of the sources, a method has been 
developed to approach the uncertainty in SPTHA (Volpe et al in prep; Selva et al 2016a, 
2016b), based on four steps: 1) a full exploration of the aleatory uncertainty through an 
Event Tree (ET, Lorito et al 2015; Selva et al 2016a) that accounts for all available 
sources of information (e.g. Basili et al 2013); 2) the propagation of all potential sources 
till offshore (Molinari et al submitted); 3) a 2-stage filtering procedure based on Cluster 
Analysis on the results offshore in order to define a subset of “representative” events 
which approximate the hazard in the target area, in order to enable the inundation 
modelling (Lorito et al 2015); 4) the quantification of the epistemic uncertainty through 
Ensemble modelling based on (weighted) alternative implementations of steps 1 to 3 
(Marzocchi et al 2015; Selva et al 2016a). 
For Thessaloniki port (Selva et al 2016b; Volpe et al in prep), at steps 1 and 2, we 
considered a regional SPTHA which accounts for all the potential seismic sources from 
the Mediterranean Sea (>107 sources), implementing a large number of alternative 
models to explore the epistemic uncertainty (>105). Then, the 2-layer filtering 
procedure has been applied, obtaining 253 representative scenarios, which may be 
modelled to approximate the total hazard (Lorito et al 2015; Volpe et al, in prep). The 
numerical simulations were performed using a non-linear shallow-water multi-GPU code 
(HySEA, Gonzalez Vida et al 2015), using 4-level nested bathymetric grids with 
refinement ratio equal to 4 and increasing resolution from 0.4 arc-min (~740 m) to 0.1 
arc-min (~185 m) to 0.025 arc-min (~46 m) to 0.00625 arc-min (~11 m). The results 
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have been input to an Ensemble model, in order to quantify in each point of the finest 
grid hazard curves, along with epistemic uncertainty, for two intensity measures: 
maximum flow depth and maximum momentum flux. 
 
Fig. 7.6  Mean annual frequency (MAF) of exceedance values for the normalized 
performance loss of the bulk cargo terminal (TCaH, left) and for the buildings in 
complete damage state (right) for the tsunami hazard case. The green, blue and red 
continuous lines correspond to the boundaries between risk grades AA (negligible), A 
(ALARP), B (possibly unjustifiable risk), and C (intolerable) 
To assess the tsunami risk a hazard module has been developed in order to enable 
sampling among the 253 representative scenarios, considering the probability of 
occurrence of the cluster of sources that each scenario represents (Lorito et al 2015). 
This procedure is possible for any preselected alternative model of input to the SPTHA 
ensemble, enabling the propagation of hazard epistemic uncertainty into risk analysis. 
The inundation simulation results for each sampled scenario are then loaded, in order to 
retrieve the tsunami intensity for any selected location. Note that, since the SPTHA 
analysis is based on an explicit simulation of each scenario, spatial correlations of the 
tsunami intensity are automatically accounted for. Given that the inundation simulation 
does not integrate potential collapses, tsunami intensity should be retrieved in proximity 
of each component’s perimeter and outside the structure. In order to avoid any 
unwanted biases (e.g. retrieve the tsunami intensity over the roof of buildings, where 
the modelled tsunami flow depth is subtracted the height of the building), a 
characteristic radius has been assigned to each component, and the largest intensity 
value within the defined circle is obtained. Damages and non-functionalities are then 
sampled from the respective fragility curves (Table 7.1) and the retrieved tsunami 
intensities. The analysis has been implemented for the port infrastructures (cranes, 
electric power network components and individual buildings) and the PIs for the analysed 
system are evaluated. In Fig. 7.6 we show an indicative example for one of the 
alternative models (i.e. the epistemic uncertainty is not considered here). The container 
terminal is not expected to experience any loss (TCoH), while the loss in the cargo 
terminal (TCoH) is negligible. This is due to the non-vulnerable condition of waterfront 
structures, the high damage thresholds for the cranes (i.e. high inundation values that 
are not expected in the study area) as described in the fragility curves used in the 
application and the distance of the electric power substations from the shoreline. The 
annual probabilities for buildings collapses are also low. As an example 10% of the total 
buildings in the Port (~9 structures) will be completed damaged under tsunami forces 
with annual probability equal to 5·10-5. 
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Scenario-based risk assessment (ST-L2d / L3d) 
A scenario-based system-wide seismic risk analysis is performed complementary to the 
classical PRA approach described previously, to identify as accurately as possible the 
local site response at the port area and to reduce the corresponding uncertainties. Two 
different seismic scenarios were defined in collaboration with a pool of experts: the 
standard seismic design scenario and an extreme scenario corresponding to return 
periods of Tm=475 years and Tm=4975 years respectively. To perform the site response 
analyses a target spectrum for seismic bedrock conditions (Vs=700-800 m/s) and a suite 
of acceleration time histories are needed. For the 475 years scenario, the target 
spectrum is defined based on the disaggregation of the probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis (SRM-LIFE 2007; Papaioannou 2004). This study has shown that the most 
significant contribution to seismic hazard for Thessaloniki port is associated with the 
Anthemountas fault system (i.e. a normal fault) regardless of the return period. In 
particular, for the 475 years scenario, the maximum annual exceedance probability for a 
certain PGA value with a moment magnitude Mw of 5.7 and an epicentral distance Repi of 
14.6 km was provided. For the 4975 years scenario, an extreme rupture scenario 
breaking along the whole Anthemountas fault zone with a characteristic magnitude Mw of 
7.0, close to the maximum magnitude of the seismic source, was assumed. The GMPE 
proposed by Akkar and Bommer (2010) is applied, similarly to the probabilistic 
assessment. In addition to magnitude and distance, both hazard scenarios include an 
error term ε (which measures the number of standard deviations of logarithmic residuals 
 to be accounted for in GMPE) responsible for an appreciable proportion of spectral 
ordinates and the contribution from ε grows with the return period (Bommer and 
Acavedo 2004). Thus, the median spectral values plus 0.5 standard deviations and 1 
standard deviation are considered for the 475 years and the 4975 years scenarios 
respectively. A set of 15 accelerograms is selected for the 475 years scenario referring to 
rock or very stiff soils that on average fit the target spectrum. For the extreme scenario, 
10 synthetic accelerograms are computed to fit the target spectrum (4975 years 
scenario I) and broadband ground motions are generated using 3D physics-based 
“source-to-site” numerical simulations (4975 years scenario II, Smerzini et al 
submitted).  
Three representative soil profiles (denoted as A, B and C) are considered for the site 
response analyses (see Fig. 7.3) with fundamental periods To equal to 1.58s, 1.60s and 
1.24s respectively. The soil profiles have been defined based on previous studies and 
new measurements. 1D equivalent-linear (EQL) and nonlinear (NL) site response 
analyses including also the potential for liquefaction are carried out for the three soil 
profiles using as input motions at the seismic bedrock the ones estimated for the 475 
years and 4975 years seismic scenarios (I and II). The numerical codes Strata (Kottke 
and Rathje 2008) and Cyclic1D (Elgamal et al 2015) are used. To investigate the impact 
of the uncertainty in the shear wave velocity (Vs) profiles, the analyses are performed for 
the basic geotechnical models, considering a standard deviation of the natural logarithm 
of the Vs equal to 0.2. In particular, 100 realizations of the Vs profiles are considered in 
Strata using Monte Carlo simulations and the calculated response from each realization 
is then used to estimate statistical properties of the seismic response. In total 1500 and 
1200 simulations are performed for the 475 and 4975 (I and II) scenarios respectively. 
The randomization of the Vs and the incorporation in Monte Carlo simulations is 
performed through the model proposed by Toro (1995). The corresponding site response 
variability was assessed in Cyclic1D considering expect for the basic Vs model, upper-
range and lower-range models utilizing a logarithmic standard deviation for the Vs profile 
equal to 0.2 consistently with the Strata simulations. For the EQL approach the results 
are presented in terms of PGA with depth, acceleration response spectra and spectral 
and Fourier ratios. For the NL approach, the variation of horizontal and vertical PGD, 
maximum shear strain and stress, effective confinement and excess pore water pressure 
with depth were also computed for each analysis. Comparative plots between the EQL 
and NL approaches are shown in Fig. 7.7 for the 475 years and 4975 years I scenarios 
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for profile A while Fig. 7.8 depicts indicative results of the NL analysis for the selected 
input motions for the same soil profile. 
The spectral values and shapes are generally comparable between the two approaches 
for the 475 year scenario while the response is very different for the extreme scenario 
that is associated with increasing shear strain accumulation. For both scenarios, the EQL 
spectral shapes are flatter and have less period-to-period fluctuations than the NL ones. 
The lower spectral values predicted by the NL approach for the extreme seismic scenario 
could be attributed to the liquefaction that may also result in large permanent ground 
deformations, which cannot be simulated by the EQL analysis. The results of the NL 
approach indicate (although not fully presented herein) that liquefaction is evident for all 
soil profiles and scenarios. However, for the extreme scenario the liquefiable layers are 
larger and extended to greater depths (up to 35m, e.g. see Fig. 7.8- left). Among the 
three representative soil profiles, liquefaction effects are shown to be more pronounced 
in profile A. Large variability in the computed permanent displacements is shown for the 
different seismic input motions (e.g. see Fig. 7.8- right). Generally low-frequency input 
motions increase the accumulation of lateral deformations and settlements. The 
computed maximum horizontal displacement values when considering the basic 
geotechnical models are 4.5 cm and 18.6 cm for the 475 and 4975 years seismic 
scenarios respectively, while the corresponding values for the vertical displacements 
(settlements) are 4.8 cm and 11.0 cm. 
 
Fig. 7.7  Median ± standard deviation elastic 5% response spectra at the ground surface 
for soil profile A using the EQL (left) and NL (right) approaches for the 475 years 
scenario (top) and the 4975 years scenario I (bottom) 
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Fig. 7.8  Variation of effective confinement (left) and settlement with depth (right) for 
soil profile A for the 475 years scenario (top) and the 4975 years scenario (bottom) 
The scenario-based risk assessment of the port buildings and infrastructures is initially 
performed taking into account the potential physical damages and corresponding losses 
of the different components of the port. Buildings, waterfront structures, cargo handling 
equipment and the power supply system are examined using the fragility models for 
ground shaking and liquefaction (Table 7.1). In particular, the vulnerability assessment 
is performed for the 475 and 4975 years scenarios (I and II) based on the EQL and NL 
site-response analyses. The results from soil profile A, B or C were considered in the 
fragility analysis, depending on the proximity of each component to the location of the 
three soil profiles. In particular, for the EQL approach, the calculated PGA values at the 
ground surface from the total analysis cases (i.e. 2200 analyses) for each soil profile 
were taken into account for the vulnerability assessment due to ground shaking. For the 
NL approach, except for the PGA values, the PGD (horizontal and vertical) values at the 
ground surface were also considered to evaluate the potential damages to buildings and 
infrastructures due to liquefaction effects. Finally, the combined damages are estimated 
by combining the damage state probabilities due to the liquefaction (PL) and ground 
shaking (PGS), based on the assumption that damage due to ground shaking is 
independent and not affect the damage due to liquefaction (NIBS, 2004). Once the 
probabilities of exceeding the specified DS are estimated, a median ±1 standard 
deviation damage index dm is evaluated, to quantify the structural losses as the ratio of 
cost of repair to cost of replacement taking values from 0: no damage (cost of repair 
equals 0) to 1: complete damage (cost of repair equals the cost of replacement).  
The spatial distribution of the estimated losses for buildings indicates that a non-
negligible percentage of the port buildings is expected to suffer significant losses (higher 
than moderate). The median values of this percentage range from 7% for the design 
scenario (NL approach) to 37% for the 4975 years scenario I (EQL approach). This is to 
be expected taking into account that all buildings were constructed with low or no 
seismic code provisions. Among the considered building typologies, the RC structures 
appear to be less vulnerable compared to the steel and URM systems. The estimated 
losses are also significantly dependent on the analysis approach. In particular, the EQL 
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approach is associated with higher damages and losses even for the design scenario, 
while for the NL approach the losses to the cranes, waterfronts and electric power 
substations are expected solely for the 4975 scenario I. 
The systemic risk is assessed following the methodology presented in the previous 
section (PRA approach) taking again into account the interdependencies of specific 
components. It is observed that the EQL approach is associated with higher number of 
non-functional components for all considered seismic scenarios whereas for the NL 
approach non-functional components are present only for the 4975 years scenario I. The 
estimated PIs of the port are normalized to the respective value referring to non-seismic 
conditions (Table 7.2). As also evidenced by the estimated functionality state of each 
component, the port system is non-functional both in terms of TCaH and TCoH for the 
4975 years scenario I. A 100% and 67% performance loss is estimated for the TCoH and 
TCaH respectively when considering the EQL approach for the 475 years and 4975 years 
II scenarios, while the port is fully functional when considering the NL approach both in 
terms of TCaH and TCoH for the latter scenarios. Thus, it is observed that among the 
four different outcomes determined for the extreme scenario for both PIs, the CI passes 
the stress test in the 4975 years scenario II and NL method, which could be judged as 
the most reliable. It is noted that the estimated PIs do not change when considering the 
median+1standard deviation damage indices in the computation of the components’ 
functionality. However, when the median-1standard deviation damage indices are taken 
into account in the calculations, a 100% performance loss is estimated only for the 4975 
years scenario I while the port is fully functional for all the other analysis cases both in 
terms of TCaH and TCoH. 
Table 7.2  Estimated normalized performance loss of the port system for TCaH and TCoH 
and comparison with risk objectives for the scenario based assessment 
Scenario 
Analysis 
type 
Performance loss 
(1-PI/PImax) 
Risk objectives 
Stress test 
outcome 
TCaH TCoH AA-A A-B B-C TCaH TCoH 
475 years 
EQL 0.67 1.00 
0.10 0.30 0.50 
Fail Fail 
NL 0.00 0.00 Pass Pass 
4975 years I 
EQL 1.00 1.00 
0.30 0.50 0.70 
Fail Fail 
NL 1.00 1.00 Fail Fail 
4975 years II 
EQL 0.67 1.00 
0.30 0.50 0.70 
Partly 
pass 
Fail 
NL 0.00 0.00 Pass Pass 
7.3 Phase 3: Decision phase 
The Decision phase comprises different steps including (i) the comparison of the 
assessment results with the pre-defined risk objectives, (ii) disaggregation and/or 
sensitivity analysis to identify critical events and components and (iii) recommendation 
of risk mitigation measures to improve the performance of the port.  
7.3.1 Risk objectives check 
In the first step of the decision phase, the risk assessment results are compared with the 
defined risk objectives to check whether the port system passes, partially passes or fails 
the stress test and to define the grading system parameters for the next evaluation of 
the stress test since the performance of the CI or performance objectives can change 
over time (Esposito et al 2017).  
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In Fig. 7.5 risk boundaries are plotted together with the MAF curves of the assessed 
performance loss. With reference to both bulk cargo and container terminals (TCaH, 
TCoH curves) the port obtains grade B, meaning that the risk is possibly unjustifiable 
and the CI partly passes this evaluation. The basis for redefinition of risk objectives in 
the next stress test evaluation is the characteristic point of risk, which is defined as the 
point associated with the greatest risk above the ALARP region (blue and red dots for 
TCaH and TCoH curves respectively). These points are the farthest from the A-B 
boundary (blue line). The proposed grading system foresees the reduction of the 
boundary between grades B and C (red line) in the next stress test, which is equal to the 
amount of risk beyond the ALARP region assessed, represented in this application by the 
corresponding red dashed lines in case of the bulk cargo and cargo terminals. The plot in 
Fig. 7.6 (left panel) indicates that the CI receives grade AA (negligible risk), and as 
expected in this example application, passes the stress test for the tsunami hazard. 
Indicative scalar performance boundaries in terms of the normalized performance loss 
are shown in Table 3 together with the corresponding results of the scenario based 
assessment. It is seen that the CI may pass, partly pass or fail for the specific evaluation 
of the stress test (receiving grades AA, B and C respectively) depending on the selected 
seismic scenario, the analysis approach and the considered risk metric (TCaH, TCoH). 
Based on the proposed grading system, for the case which the port obtains grade B and 
partly passes the stress test, the BC boundary in the next stress test is reduced (i.e. BC: 
53% performance loss) while the other boundaries remain unchanged. It is noted that 
different grades can be derived from the probabilistic and scenario-based assessments 
varying between AA (for the scenario based and the probabilistic tsunami risk 
assessments) and C (for the scenario-based and probabilistic seismic risk assessments). 
It is also worth noting that the risk objectives and the time between successive stress 
tests should be defined by the CI authority and regulator. Since regulatory requirements 
do not yet exist for the port infrastructures, the boundaries need to rely on judgments. 
7.4 Phase 4: Report phase 
The final stage of the test involves reporting the findings, which are summarized in Table 
7.3. 
Table 7.3  Summary report of the stress test outcomes 
Level 1 Component level – Seismic Hazard 
 Buildings Cranes Quay 
walls 
Electric power 
stations 
Number of components 85 35 25 17 
Target probability of 
collapse* 
4.7x10-6 - 
6.3x10-6 
4.9x10-6 -  
6.3x10-6 
4.7x10-6 - 
6.3x10-6 
4.7x10-6 -
6.3x10-6 
Outcome 0% pass 
100% fail 
0% pass 
100% fail 
0% pass 
100% fail 
0% pass 
100% fail 
Level 1 Component level – Tsunami Hazard 
 Buildings Cranes Electric power 
stations 
Number of components 85 35 17 
Target probability of 
collapse* 
5.8x10-6 - 
9.3x10-6 
6.6x10-6 - 
8.8x10-6 
5.8x10-6 - 
7.9x10-6 
Outcome 0% pass 
100% fail 
83% pass 
17% fail 
0% pass 
100% fail 
Level 2b System level – Seismic Hazard (PRA) 
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Risk measure TCoH TCaH 
Objectives boundaries 
(annual probability for 
100% loss, logarithmic 
slope = 1) 
B-C: 4.5x10-3 
 A-B: 2.0x10-3,                                 
AA-A: 7.5x10-4 
B-C: 4.5x10-3 
A-B: 2.0x10-3,                                                 
AA-A: 7.5x10-4 
Grade B B 
Outcome partially pass partially pass 
Next stress test objectives 
 
B-C: 2.5x10-3 
A-B: unchanged,                          
AA-A: unchanged 
B-C: 3.5x10-3 
A-B: unchanged,                         
AA-A: unchanged 
Level 2b System level – Tsunami Hazard (PRA) 
Risk measure TCoH TCaH 
Objectives boundaries 
(annual probability for 
100% loss, logarithmic 
slope = 1) 
B-C: 4.5x10-3 
A-B: 2.0x10-3,                                
AA-A: 7.5x10-4 
B-C: 4.5x10-3 
A-B: 2.0x10-3,                                   
AA-A: 7.5x10-4 
Grade AA AA 
Outcome pass pass 
Next stress test objectives unchanged unchanged 
Level 2d/3d System level – Seismic Hazard (Scenario based) 
Risk measure TCoH TCaH 
Objectives-475 years 
scenario (% loss) 
B-C: 50, A-B: 30, AA-A: 10 
Objectives-4975 years 
scenario (% loss) 
B-C: 70, A-B: 50, AA-A: 30 
Grade   
475 EQL C C 
475 NL AA AA 
4975 years I EQL C C 
4975 years I NL C C 
4975 years II EQL C B 
4975 years II NL A A 
Outcome   
475 EQL fail fail 
475 NL pass pass 
4975 years I EQL fail fail 
4975 years I NL fail fail 
4975 years II EQL fail partially pass 
4975 years II NL pass pass 
Next stress test objectives   
Objectives-4975 years 
scenario (% loss) 
B-C: 53, A-B: unchanged, AA-A: unchanged 
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8. Application of stress test concepts to industrial district, 
Italy 
This application of the STREST methodology focused on an industrial district in the 
province of Arezzo, in the Tuscany Region of northern Italy. This application was chosen 
to demonstrate the performance and consequences assessment of multiple-site, low-
risk, high-impact, non-nuclear CIs. Economic loss-based risk measures and objectives 
have been used, given the large economic losses that were experienced in Italy following 
the Emilia-Romagna earthquakes in May 2012 (see STREST D2.3 Krausmann et al 
2014). The economic loss has been estimated considering the loss due to structural 
damage, non-structural damage, contents damage and associated direct business 
interruption. Indirect business interruption is inferred from the customer base of the 
facilities contributing most to the loss. A summary is provided below on the main 
features of each phase of this Stress Test application. 
8.1 Phase 1: Pre-assessment phase 
In this phase of the stress test, all exposure, hazard and cost/loss data required to carry 
out a probabilistic risk assessment was sought, as well as data useful for the assessment 
of indirect losses (such as the customer base of each industrial facility). 
The exposure data for this case study has been provided by the industrial partner in this 
case study: the Sezione Sismica, Regione Toscana. A database of 425 pre-cast 
reinforced concrete industrial facilities in the whole of Tuscany was provided, and a 
smaller database covering the 300 assets in the province of Arezzo was produced. The 
available exposure data included coordinates, year of construction, floor area, structural 
type, non-structural elements, and other data useful for identifying value of contents, 
type of business, and extent of customer base. The data on the structural and non-
structural features of the structures allowed each building to be assigned to one of 8 
sub-classes, as shown in Fig. 8.1, where Type 1 refers to buildings with long saddle roof 
beams, Type 2 to buildings with shorter rectangular beams and larger distance between 
the portals, V1 is vertical cladding, H1 is horizontal cladding and M1 is masonry infill. 
 
Fig. 8.1  Sub-classes of buildings in terms of structural and non-structural elements 
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Only seismic hazard has been considered in this case study, as it is the predominant 
hazard to which the industrial building stock in Tuscany is exposed. In order to generate 
a large set of ground motion fields characterizing the seismicity of a given region, a 
probabilistic seismic hazard model comprised of the following three components is 
required: a seismological/source model that describes the location, geometry, and 
seismic activity of the sources; a ground-motion model that describes the probability of 
exceeding a given level of ground motion at a site, conditioned on a set of event and 
path characteristics; and a site condition model that describes the characteristics of the 
soil at each site. 
The European project “Seismic Hazard Harmonization in Europe” (SHARE, 2009–2013) 
has produced a European seismic hazard model (Woessner et al 2015) with three source 
models (one based on area sources, one that uses fault sources and a third based on 
distributed seismicity). The three aforementioned models can be used separately to 
produce a hazard model, although it was recommended by the SHARE consortium that 
these models should be combined in a logic tree, together with additional logic tree 
branches to describe the epistemic uncertainty in the GMPEs. The SHARE seismological 
models are available from the European Facility for Earthquake Hazard and Risk portal 
(www.efehr.org), and can be used to generate spatially correlated ground-motion fields 
using the Global Earthquake Model’s hazard and risk software, the OpenQuake-engine 
(Silva et al 2014). 
Fig. 8.2 presents the mean hazard map that has been calculated for Tuscany, with the 
OpenQuake-engine and the SHARE hazard model, in terms of PGA with a 10% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years. In order to account for site amplification, the Vs30 
value of the soil at each location in the exposure model is needed. This is not currently 
available for the locations of the industrial facilities in the exposure model, and so an 
estimation of the value of Vs30 based on a proxy (topography) has been employed1, as 
shown in Fig. 8.3. 
 
Fig. 8.2  Mean hazard map for Tuscany based on SHARE logic tree with Vs30 = 800m/s 
(in terms of PGA with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years) 
                                           
1 http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/apps/vs30/predefined.php 
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Fig. 8.3  Estimates of site conditions in Tuscany from topographic slope 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/apps/vs30/predefined.php) 
For the component level stress test assessment carried out herein (wherein each 
industrial facility is considered as an individual component) the annual probability of 
structural collapse has been taken as the risk measure, and the required objective has 
been sought by reference to European design norms. An annual structural collapse 
probability value of 10-5 for the boundary A-B and 2.0x10-4 for the boundary B-C of the 
grading system of the STREST methodology. 
For the system level assessment, two types of risk metrics have been considered for the 
stress test: 
o Average annual loss;
o Mean annual rate of specific level of loss.
Specific objectives for these risk metrics have not been defined by Regione Toscana, and 
so hypothetical values have been considered for illustrative purposes of the 
methodology. It has been decided to use the following objectives for the total average 
annual loss: the boundary A-B would be less 0.05% of the total exposure value and 
0.1% would define boundary B-C. For the second objective, the mean annual rate of a 
loss due to business interruption equal to 7 times the daily business interruption 
exposure (i.e. 10 Million Euro) should not be higher than 10-4 (i.e. 1 in 10,000 years) for 
boundary A-B and this would be 30 days for boundary B-C (i.e. 42 Million Euro). 
8.2 Phase 2: Assessment phase (ST-L1a / ST-L2b) 
A risk-based component level assessment has been undertaken for all 300 industrial 
facilities in Arezzo using hazard curves (i.e. PGA versus annual probability of 
exceedance) estimated with the OpenQuake-engine using the SHARE hazard model 
(Woessner et al 2015), and amplified considering topography-based Vs30 estimates, 
together with the complete damage structural fragility functions for each sub-class of 
structure that were derived in STREST D4.3 (Crowley et al 2015). 
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Fig. 8.4  Annual probability of collapse of all industrial buildings in Arezzo 
For the system level assessment, vulnerability models have been developed for each 
sub-class for structural, non-structural, contents and business interruption loss following 
the methodology and assumptions outlined in STREST D4.3 (Crowley et al 2015). The 
SHARE logic tree model and the topography-based site conditions have been used to 
model the seismic hazard. In order to calculate probabilistic seismic risk for a spatially 
distributed portfolio of assets in Arezzo, the Probabilistic Event-Based Risk calculator 
from the OpenQuake-engine (Silva et al 2014) has been employed. This calculator is 
capable of generating loss exceedance curves and risk maps for various return periods 
based on probabilistic seismic hazard, with an event-based Monte Carlo approach that 
allows both the spatial correlation of the ground motion residuals and the correlation of 
the loss uncertainty to be modelled. Loss curves and loss maps can be computed for five 
different loss types such as: structural components, non-structural components, 
contents, downtime losses and fatalities. The loss exceedance curves describe the 
probability of exceedance of different loss levels and the risk maps describe the loss 
values for a given probability of exceedance, over the specified time period. Additionally, 
aggregated loss exceedance curves can also be produced using this calculator, which 
describe the probability of exceedance of different loss levels for all assets in the 
exposure model. 
The total loss results of the probabilistic risk assessment for the portfolio of industrial 
facilities in Arezzo are shown in Fig. 8.5 in terms of a loss exceedance curve. Similar 
curves for each component of the loss (structural, non-structural, contents and business-
interruption) have also been produced. The loss exceedance curve for each of the 
branches of the logic tree is shown with a thin line and the mean across all branches is 
shown with a thick line. 
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Fig. 8.5  Total loss exceedance curves for all industrial facilities in Arezzo 
The average annual losses (AAL) have been calculated from the loss exceedance curves 
and the results are presented in Table 8.1. This table shows that the largest component 
of loss is given by business interruption. The values of AAL as well as the mean annual 
rates of specific loss values will be checked against the risk objectives in the Decision 
Phase. 
Table 8.1  Average annual losses for Arezzo industrial facilities 
 
Average Annual 
Losses 
Average Annual Loss 
Ratio (%)1 
Structural € 7,330 0.016 
Non-Structural € 25,047 0.018 
Contents € 49,022 0.033 
Business Interruption € 93,932 0.067 
Total Losses € 175,330 0.052 
1 Calculated as AAL / exposure value for each component 
8.3 Phase 3: Decision phase 
This step of the stress test requires a comparison of the results of the risk assessment 
with the risk objectives, to check whether the industrial facilities pass each level of the 
Stress Test. 
According to the grading system of the component test, 260 facilities are assigned grade 
B (partly pass) and 40 facilities are assigned grade C (and thus fail the stress test). 
The results also show that the A-B system level assessment objective is not met as the 
total AAL percentage is 0.052%, but the B-C level is met. Hence the grading would be B 
(partly pass) for this objective. The business interruption loss at a mean annual rate of 
exceedance of 10-4 is 64 Million Euro (which can be translated as an average of 45 days 
of business interruption), and so the grading would be C (fail) for this objective. 
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In order to provide guidance on how to mitigate the risk, disaggregation of the results 
has been carried out. The critical components for each loss, according to the 
disaggregation of the average annual loss are given in Fig. 8.6. It can be noted that the 
most critical typologies might depend on the type of loss that is of most concern. 
 
Fig. 8.6  Disaggregation of average annual loss according to building sub-class for each 
component of loss 
In order to understand the indirect impact of the business interruption losses on the 
region and/or whole country, the customer base of the facilities that are contributing to 
the average annual business interruption loss can also be presented (a similar calculation 
could be done also for any value of loss calculated herein). The percentage of each 
customer base AAL, as a portion of the total AAL, is given in Table 8.2, where it can be 
seen that 45% of the business interruption AAL is caused by facilities that have a 
customer base that goes beyond the province of Arezzo, and could thus cause additional 
indirect losses at a regional, national and international scale (in a decreasing order of 
importance). 
Table 8.2. Percentage of each customer base AAL to the total business interruption AAL 
Customer base Percentage of AAL (for BI) % 
Not Determined (ND) 21 
Comune (municipality) 8 
Province 27 
Regional 23 
National 18 
International 3 
There are 40 facilities that fail the component level assessment and should be targeted 
for structural investigation and potential upgrade. They all belong to the H1 subclass 
(i.e. pre-code type 1 portal frame with horizontal cladding). 
The sub-typologies that contribute most to the total average annual losses are V2 (i.e. 
pre-code type 2 portal frame with vertical cladding), H1 (i.e. pre-code type 1 portal 
frame with horizontal cladding) and V3 (i.e. low-code type 2 portal frame with vertical 
cladding). Hence, in addition to investigating further the H1 sub-class buildings, the V2 
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and V3 typologies should also be addressed, and the customer base of the facility should 
also be used as a prioritization tool to identify the facilities to investigate and potentially 
retrofit first, in order to also reduce the impact of indirect losses from these facilities. 
Disaggregation of the hazard (not shown here due to space limitations) for the business 
interruption loss (which is also the largest contribution to total loss), has identified that a 
wide range of events contribute to the loss from lower magnitude close events to higher 
magnitude distance events. This implies that these losses are not just driven by the rare 
events, and thus mitigation efforts to protect against business interruption should be 
given high priority. Given that business interruption is directly related to structural and 
non-structural damage, this can be addressed through the retrofitting activities 
mentioned above. 
8.4 Phase 4: Report phase 
The final stage of the test involves reporting the findings, which are summarized in Table 
8.3. 
Table 8.3. Summary report of the stress test outcomes 
Level 1 Component level – Seismic Hazard 
 Structural elements of buildings 
Number of components 300  
Target probability of 
collapse 
10-5 - 2x10-4 
Outcome 260 partly pass (grade B) and 40 fail (grade C) 
Level 2b System level – Seismic Hazard (PRA) 
Risk measure Average Annual Loss 
(as percentage of total 
exposure) 
1 in 10,000 year business 
interruption loss 
Objectives boundaries  A-B: 0.05% 
B-C: 0.1% 
A-B: 7 days 
B-C: 30 days 
Grade B C 
Outcome partly pass fail 
Next stress test objectives A-B (as above) B-C (as above) 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 73 
 
9. Conclusions and recommendations 
In the context of STREST project, an engineering risk-based methodology for stress test 
critical non-nuclear infrastructures, named ST@STREST, has been developed (see 
STREST ERR4 Esposito et al 2016). In particular, a multi-level framework has been 
proposed composed of four main phases and nine steps to be conducted sequentially. 
First the goals, the method, the time frame, and the total costs of the stress test are 
defined. Then, the stress test is performed at component and system levels; 
subsequently, the outcomes are checked and compared to the acceptance criteria. A 
stress test grade is assigned and the global outcome is determined by employing a 
grading system proposed herein. According to the outcome the parameters of the 
following evaluation of stress test are adjusted. Finally, the results are reported and 
communicated to stakeholders and authorities. 
ST@STREST has been applied and tested in six CIs in Europe, namely: a petrochemical 
plant in Milazzo, Italy (CI-A1), large dams of the Valais region, Switzerland (CI-A2), 
hydrocarbon pipelines, Turkey (CI-B1), the Gasunie national gas storage and distribution 
network, Holland (CI-B2), the port infrastructure of Thessaloniki, Greece (CI-B3),  and 
an industrial district in the region of Tuscany, Italy (CI-C1). Different stress test levels 
were selected according to the characteristics and available resources in each case 
study. The objective was to demonstrate how the proposed framework is implemented in 
different classes of CIs exposed to variant hazards, therefore reasonable assumptions or 
simplifications were made in some steps of the applications. It is noted that the STREST 
consortium takes no responsibility in the research results provided in this report, as 
these results should not be considered formal stress tests. 
The stress test to the ENI/Kuwait oil refinery and petrochemical plant in Milazzo, showed 
that the earthquake impact is more important for the atmospheric storage tanks, while 
the tsunami effect on the atmospheric storage vessels along the shore line is limited. 
Neither an earthquake nor a tsunami significantly increases the failure frequency of, and 
hence the risk imposed by, pressurized vessels (like LPG spheres). The stress test to the 
large dams in the Valais region of Switzerland exposed to multi-hazard effects, 
considering earthquakes, floods, internal erosion, bottom outlet malfunctions, and 
hydropower system malfunction concluded that the risk associated with the conceptual 
dam following the characteristic point of risk approach is acceptable. The stress test to 
the major hydrocarbon pipelines in Turkey, exposed to seismic hazard, and in particular 
to permanent fault displacements, indicated that retrofit is potentially needed for the 
pipes at pipe-fault intersection locations. The stress test to the Gasunie national gas 
storage and distribution network in Holland, exposed to earthquake and liquefaction 
effects, showed that soil liquefaction is the dominant failure mechanism. Specific pipe 
sections, which were identified to be the weakest links in the network, should be checked 
on their current actual state assessing the need for upgrading, while retrofitting of 
specific stations might be also necessary. The stress test to the port infrastructures of 
Thessaloniki subjected to earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction hazards showed a 
variation in the outcomes depending on the analysis type. Infrastructures where 
potential upgrade should be considered were indicated. The stress test to the industrial 
district in the region of Tuscany, exposed to seismic hazard, pointed out the facilities 
which should be targeted for structural investigation and potential upgrade, and that 
mitigation efforts to protect against business interruption should be given high priority. 
Table 9.1 summarizes the results of the six applications in terms of the grading range 
that is defined in each level and hazard considered.  
In the framework of the case studies the objectives boundaries have been set mainly 
based on judgments, however, formulation of risk acceptance criteria is not a 
straightforward task. In practice, setting objectives and establishing risk measures is 
very difficult and strongly dependent on legal, socio-economic and political contexts and 
they should be defined by the corresponding stakeholders. Nevertheless, the results of 
the stress test will stimulate stakeholders to take specific measures to upgrade or not 
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the existing infrastructure such that they will improve their grading in the following 
stress test cycle. 
Table 9.1. Grading range for the six case studies of STREST 
Case 
study 
Hazard 
Grading range 
ST-
L1a 
ST-
L2a 
ST-
L2b 
ST-
L2c 
ST-
L2d 
ST-
L3a 
ST-
L3b 
ST-
L3c 
ST-
L3d 
CI-A1 
Earthquake AA-C - AA-C - AA-C - - - - 
Tsunami AA-C - AA-C - AA-C - - - - 
CI-A2 
Earthquake/ 
Flood/ 
Internal 
erosion/ 
Outlet 
malfunction/ 
Hydropower 
system 
malfunction 
AA-A - AA-A - AA-A - - AA-A AA-A 
CI-B1 Earthquake AA AA - - - - - - - 
CI-B2 
Earthquake/
Liquefaction 
AA-A AA-A - - - - - - - 
CI-B3 
Earthquake C - - - - - - - - 
Tsunami AA-C - AA - - - - - - 
Earthquake/
Liquefaction 
- - B - AA-C - - - AA-C 
CI-C1 Earthquake B-C - B-C - - - - - - 
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